Public scan — anyone with this URL can view this analysis. Sign up to track your own repos privately, run scheduled re-scans, and get AI fix prompts via your dashboard.
Sign up free Scan another repo

cjroberts2013/brenk-operating-platform

https://github.com/cjroberts2013/brenk-operating-platform · scanned 2026-06-17 01:49 UTC (1 month, 1 week ago)

37 raw signals (0 security + 37 graph)

File as issue Image
UNIFIED Repobility · multi-layer engine · AI coders

Complete repo analysis

Last scanned 1 month, 1 week ago · v2 · last Δ -10.1 (diff) · 36 actionable findings from 1 signal source. 1 repeated signal grouped for readability. Security checks, system graph analysis, and verified AI-agent feedback are merged into one review queue.

JSON
Combined
66.6
/100
Security checks
67
0 findings
System graph
67
88.9% cov · 36 findings
Critical
0
click to filter
Agents
10
0 votes
Crowd
0
reported
Severity distribution — click a segment to filter
Active filters: excluding tests × Reset all
Severity: Critical 0 High 10 Medium 6 Low 6 9-Layer: Software Security Quality Integrity Frontend Hardware Data Network Cicd Source: Security checks 0 System graph 36 Crowd 0 Layer: Frontend 3 Hardware 2 Quality 21 Security 10
Corpus Intelligence Cross-corpus context (cohort percentile, top patterns, fix plan) is shown only on repositories you own. Sign up and connect your repo to view it.
Scan summary Repository scanned at 66.6/100 with 88.9% coverage. It contains 1092 nodes across 30 cross-layer flows, written primarily in mixed languages. Engine surfaced 37 findings — concentrated in quality (22), security (10), frontend (3). Risk profile is high: 0 critical, 10 high, 6 medium. Recommended next step: open the quality layer findings first — that's where the highest-impact wins live.

Showing 22 of 36 actionable findings. 37 raw detector signals were grouped into reader-sized issues. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

high System graph security auth conf 1.00 FastAPI DELETE `delete_vendor` without auth dependency — backend/app/api/v1/endpoints/vendors.py:300
`@router.delete` decorator with no `Depends(get_current_user)` or auth-shaped dependency in its signature. Mutating endpoints should require authentication unless explicitly public.
backend/app/api/v1/endpoints/vendors.py:300 securityAuth fastapi unauth mutation
high System graph security auth conf 1.00 FastAPI PATCH `update_trade` without auth dependency — backend/app/api/v1/endpoints/trades.py:102
`@router.patch` decorator with no `Depends(get_current_user)` or auth-shaped dependency in its signature. Mutating endpoints should require authentication unless explicitly public.
backend/app/api/v1/endpoints/trades.py:102 securityAuth fastapi unauth mutation
high System graph security auth conf 1.00 FastAPI PATCH `update_vendor` without auth dependency — backend/app/api/v1/endpoints/vendors.py:276
`@router.patch` decorator with no `Depends(get_current_user)` or auth-shaped dependency in its signature. Mutating endpoints should require authentication unless explicitly public.
backend/app/api/v1/endpoints/vendors.py:276 securityAuth fastapi unauth mutation
high System graph security auth conf 1.00 FastAPI PATCH `update_work_order` without auth dependency — backend/app/api/v1/endpoints/work_orders.py:553
`@router.patch` decorator with no `Depends(get_current_user)` or auth-shaped dependency in its signature. Mutating endpoints should require authentication unless explicitly public.
backend/app/api/v1/endpoints/work_orders.py:553 securityAuth fastapi unauth mutation
high System graph security auth conf 1.00 FastAPI POST `create_trade` without auth dependency — backend/app/api/v1/endpoints/trades.py:69
`@router.post` decorator with no `Depends(get_current_user)` or auth-shaped dependency in its signature. Mutating endpoints should require authentication unless explicitly public.
backend/app/api/v1/endpoints/trades.py:69 securityAuth fastapi unauth mutation
high System graph security auth conf 1.00 FastAPI POST `create_vendor` without auth dependency — backend/app/api/v1/endpoints/vendors.py:244
`@router.post` decorator with no `Depends(get_current_user)` or auth-shaped dependency in its signature. Mutating endpoints should require authentication unless explicitly public.
backend/app/api/v1/endpoints/vendors.py:244 securityAuth fastapi unauth mutation
high System graph security auth conf 1.00 FastAPI POST `receive_sc_webhook` without auth dependency — backend/app/api/v1/endpoints/webhooks.py:54
`@router.post` decorator with no `Depends(get_current_user)` or auth-shaped dependency in its signature. Mutating endpoints should require authentication unless explicitly public.
backend/app/api/v1/endpoints/webhooks.py:54 securityAuth fastapi unauth mutation
high System graph security auth conf 1.00 FastAPI POST `submit_work_order_invoice` without auth dependency — backend/app/api/v1/endpoints/work_orders.py:515
`@router.post` decorator with no `Depends(get_current_user)` or auth-shaped dependency in its signature. Mutating endpoints should require authentication unless explicitly public.
backend/app/api/v1/endpoints/work_orders.py:515 securityAuth fastapi unauth mutation
high System graph security auth conf 1.00 FastAPI POST `sync_vendors_endpoint` without auth dependency — backend/app/api/v1/endpoints/vendors.py:144
`@router.post` decorator with no `Depends(get_current_user)` or auth-shaped dependency in its signature. Mutating endpoints should require authentication unless explicitly public.
backend/app/api/v1/endpoints/vendors.py:144 securityAuth fastapi unauth mutation
high System graph security auth conf 1.00 FastAPI POST `trigger_work_order_sync` without auth dependency — backend/app/api/v1/endpoints/work_orders.py:398
`@router.post` decorator with no `Depends(get_current_user)` or auth-shaped dependency in its signature. Mutating endpoints should require authentication unless explicitly public.
backend/app/api/v1/endpoints/work_orders.py:398 securityAuth fastapi unauth mutation
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — frontend/lib/api/public.ts:16
Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent authority lacks a verifier contract: .claude/launch.json
This agent instruction grants code or shell authority but does not state the verification gate that decides promotion. The recurring safe pattern is: LLM proposes; deterministic tests/build/security checks verify; only verified code promotes.
.claude/launch.json VerificationClaude instruction
medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instructions exist but release-hardening basics are missing
AI-coder instruction files were found, but the repo is missing ci. Treat this as a contract gap: the agent is guided, but the generated output is not yet guarded by the controls that make it repeatable.
Repo hardeningGenerated repo pattern
medium System graph quality Placeholder conf 1.00 Critical user flow still appears backed by mock or placeholder data
A payment/auth/admin/order/billing-style flow contains mock, fake, TODO, dummy, or placeholder markers in runtime source. In the Fable corpus this is a high-leverage completeness smell: the app can look finished while the money, identity, or tenant flow is still scaffolded.
Mock dataCritical flowGenerated repo pattern
medium System graph hardware Security conf 1.00 Dockerfile runs as root: backend/Dockerfile
No non-root USER set. Containers running as root expand the blast radius of any vulnerability inside the image.
Container
medium System graph quality Placeholder conf 1.00 Placeholder or mock-heavy implementation detected
Found 56 placeholder/mock markers across 15 source files. This often means the repo looks complete while core flows still use generated scaffolding or fake data.
Mock dataIncompleteGenerated repo pattern
low System graph frontend Frontend quality conf 1.00 "active" state uses light bg in a dark theme — frontend/components/AppShell.tsx:116
A ternary like `active ? 'bg-white' : '...'` (or bg-gray-100/200) on a dark theme produces jarring white pills. Use a dark-emphasized active state instead — border + ring or slightly brighter dark bg. Example: `active ? 'bg-gray-800 border-gray-500 ring-1 ring-blue-500/30' : '…'`. Why: P-E in CHEC…
Fq active light bg
low System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 6 env vars used in code but missing from .env.example
Drift between code and config docs. The first few: `BACKFILL_DATABASE_URL`, `NEXT_PUBLIC_API_URL`, `NEXT_PUBLIC_SC_WEB_URL`, `NEXT_PUBLIC_SUPABASE_ANON_KEY`, `NEXT_PUBLIC_SUPABASE_URL`, `NODE_ENV`. Add them (with a placeholder/comment) to .env.example so onboarding doesn't break.
config drift
low System graph quality Debug conf 1.00 Debug logging residue appears in source files
Found 87 console/debugger/print-style debug statements in non-test source. This is a common fast-generation residue before production cleanup.
CleanupRepo hardeningGenerated repo pattern
low System graph hardware Supply chain conf 1.00 Docker base image is tag-pinned but not digest-pinned: python:3.13-slim
Container tags can be retagged upstream. Pin production base images to a reviewed digest (`image@sha256:...`) when reproducibility and supply-chain integrity matter.
backend/Dockerfile:5 containersPinned dependencies
low System graph quality Tests conf 1.00 Low test-to-source ratio
27 tests / 159 src (ratio 0.17).
low System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 2 occurrences Near-duplicate function bodies in 2 places
Functions with the same first-5-line body hash: backend/app/api/v1/endpoints/work_orders.py:get_work_order_sync_status, backend/app/api/v1/endpoints/work_orders.py:get_work_order This is *the* AI-coder failure mode (4× more duplication in vibe-coded repos — see https://jw.hn/ai-code-hygiene). Cons…
2 occurrences
repo-level (2 hits)
duplicatesduplication
For AI agents: Voting guide (TP/FP) MCP manifest Stdio wrapper SARIF Integrate Findings queue Vote TP/FP on findings to calibrate the engine.
For AI agents + API integrations
Email me when this repo regresses
Free. We re-scan periodically; new criticals → your inbox. No signup required for the scan itself.
API access

This page is publicly accessible at: https://repobility.com/scan/fa381800-e9ba-4cd4-a866-55f325e5ebe6/

To check status programmatically (no auth required): 

curl -s https://repobility.com/api/v1/public/scan/fa381800-e9ba-4cd4-a866-55f325e5ebe6/

Important — please don't re-submit the same URL repeatedly. The submission endpoint is idempotent: re-submitting the same git URL returns this same scan_token, not a new one. To re-scan this repo, sign up free and use the dashboard.