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openclaude

https://github.com/Gitlawb/openclaude · scanned 2026-05-17 03:05 UTC (14 hours, 18 minutes ago) · 10 languages

706 findings (22 legacy + 684 scanner) 67th percentile · Typescript · huge (>500K LoC) Scanner says 68 (higher by 9)

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UNIFIED Repobility · multi-layer engine · AI coders

Complete repo analysis

Last scanned 14 hours, 18 minutes ago · v1 · 706 findings from 2 sources. Findings combine the legacy security pipeline AND the multi-layer engine (atlas, wiring, flows, ranked) AND verified AI agent contributions.

JSON
Combined
73.9
/100
Repobility
80
22 legacy
9-layer
68
100.0% cov · 684 gaps
Critical
5
click to filter
Agents
6
0 votes
Crowd
0
reported
Severity distribution — click a segment to filter
Active filters: severity: medium × excluding tests × Reset all
Severity: Critical 5 High 8 Medium 21 Low 174 Source: Legacy 22 9-layer 684 Crowd 0 Layer: Software 57 Security 14 Quality 537 Cicd 2 Frontend 93 Hardware 3
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Scan summary Repository scanned at 68.0/100 with 100.0% coverage. It contains 15383 nodes across 3 cross-layer flows, written primarily in mixed languages. Engine surfaced 684 findings — concentrated in quality (526), frontend (93), software (52). Risk profile is high: 5 critical, 1 high, 11 medium. Recommended next step: open the quality layer findings first — that's where the highest-impact wins live.

Showing 21 of 706 findings. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

medium Legacy quality error_handling conf 1.00 [ERR002] Empty Catch Block: Empty catch blocks hide errors.
Log the error or rethrow it. Use console.error() at minimum.
src/bridge/initReplBridge.ts:328 error_handlinglegacy
medium Legacy quality error_handling conf 1.00 [ERR002] Empty Catch Block: Empty catch blocks hide errors.
Log the error or rethrow it. Use console.error() at minimum.
src/bridge/bridgeMain.ts:2068 error_handlinglegacy
medium Legacy quality error_handling conf 1.00 [ERR002] Empty Catch Block: Empty catch blocks hide errors.
Log the error or rethrow it. Use console.error() at minimum.
src/bridge/replBridge.ts:479 error_handlinglegacy
medium Legacy security llm_injection conf 0.80 [SEC017] Unbounded Input to LLM/External API: User input is passed to an LLM or external AI API (OpenAI, Anthropic, etc.) without any visible length or size validation. This creates two risks: (1) Cost abuse — an attacker can send extremely long inputs to burn through your API credits (a single 128K-token request to GPT-4 costs ~$4, and automated attacks can drain budgets in minutes). (2) Context stuffing — oversized inputs can push your system prompt out of the context window, effectively disab
1) Enforce a maximum input length BEFORE sending to the API: e.g. `if len(text) > 4000: return error`. 2) Use token counting (tiktoken for OpenAI, anthropic's token counter) to enforce token-level limits. 3) Set max_tokens on the API call to cap response cost. 4) Add rate limiting per user/IP to pr…
src/commands/thinkback/thinkback.tsx:385 llm_injectionlegacy
medium Legacy software redos conf 1.00 [SEC031] Catastrophic Backtracking Regex (ReDoS): Regex contains nested quantifiers like `(a+)+` or quantified alternation with overlapping branches. On adversarial input these patterns exhibit exponential backtracking, freezing the process. CWE-1333. Real CVEs: CVE-2017-16129 (minimatch), CVE-2021-3807 (ansi-regex), and dozens more.
Three options, pick one: 1. Rewrite the pattern to avoid nested quantifiers. E.g. `(a+)+` is functionally equivalent to `a+` for matching purposes. 2. Use Google's re2 (`pip install google-re2`): linear-time, drop-in replacement for `re` for most use cases. 3. Set a hard timeout: `s…
src/tools/shared/gitOperationTracking.ts:23 redoslegacy
medium Legacy software redos conf 1.00 [SEC031] Catastrophic Backtracking Regex (ReDoS): Regex contains nested quantifiers like `(a+)+` or quantified alternation with overlapping branches. On adversarial input these patterns exhibit exponential backtracking, freezing the process. CWE-1333. Real CVEs: CVE-2017-16129 (minimatch), CVE-2021-3807 (ansi-regex), and dozens more.
Three options, pick one: 1. Rewrite the pattern to avoid nested quantifiers. E.g. `(a+)+` is functionally equivalent to `a+` for matching purposes. 2. Use Google's re2 (`pip install google-re2`): linear-time, drop-in replacement for `re` for most use cases. 3. Set a hard timeout: `s…
src/tools/BashTool/readOnlyValidation.ts:1358 redoslegacy
medium Legacy quality quality conf 0.70 Public web app has no Content Security Policy
A Content Security Policy reduces the blast radius of injected scripts if the app is ever served through preview, static hosting, or a web container outside its normal sandbox.
index.html qualitylegacy
medium Legacy quality quality conf 0.78 Public web service has no security.txt
security.txt gives researchers and customers a safe disclosure channel. Public web apps and APIs should publish it under /.well-known/security.txt.
.well-known/security.txt qualitylegacy
medium Legacy quality quality conf 0.78 React interval is created without an explicit cleanup
Intervals created in React hooks or components should be cleared on unmount. Missing cleanup can keep stale callbacks alive after recording, polling, or overlay components close.
src/components/Spinner/useShimmerAnimation.ts:13 qualitylegacy
medium Legacy quality quality conf 0.78 React interval is created without an explicit cleanup
Intervals created in React hooks or components should be cleared on unmount. Missing cleanup can keep stale callbacks alive after recording, polling, or overlay components close.
src/cli/print.ts:543 qualitylegacy
medium 9-layer frontend frontend-quality conf 1.00 `dangerouslySetInnerHTML` used in a React component — src/commands/security-review.ts:169
Open XSS surface unless the input is provably trusted. Replace with explicit JSX or sanitize via a vetted library. Why: OWASP basics. Already partially flagged by the security analyzer. Rule id: fq.dangerous-html
frontend-qualityfq.dangerous-html
medium 9-layer quality integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — src/hooks/useTasksV2.ts:69
Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.
integrityfragile-runtimerobustness
medium 9-layer quality integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — src/services/api/claude.ts:1892
Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.
integrityfragile-runtimerobustness
medium 9-layer quality integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — src/services/api/fetchWithProxyRetry.test.ts:48
Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.
integrityfragile-runtimerobustness
medium 9-layer quality integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — src/services/mcp/client.ts:488
Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.
integrityfragile-runtimerobustness
medium 9-layer quality integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — src/utils/genericProcessUtils.ts:33
Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.
integrityfragile-runtimerobustness
medium 9-layer quality integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — src/utils/providerDiscovery.ts:279
Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.
integrityfragile-runtimerobustness
medium 9-layer cicd supply-chain conf 1.00 GitHub Actions workflow grants broad write permissions
CI tokens with write permissions increase blast radius when an action, dependency, or PR workflow is compromised. Prefer job-level least-privilege permissions.
.github/workflows/release.yml supply-chaingithub-actionsleast-privilege
medium 9-layer security owasp conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'dangerous_innerhtml' in src/commands/security-review.ts:169
Found a known-risky pattern (dangerous_innerhtml). Review and replace if possible.
src/commands/security-review.ts:169 owaspdangerous_innerhtml
medium 9-layer security owasp conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'weak_hash' in src/services/settingsSync/types.ts:30
Found a known-risky pattern (weak_hash). Review and replace if possible.
src/services/settingsSync/types.ts:30 owaspweak_hash
medium 9-layer security owasp conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'weak_hash' in src/tools/BashTool/pathValidation.ts:549
Found a known-risky pattern (weak_hash). Review and replace if possible.
src/tools/BashTool/pathValidation.ts:549 owaspweak_hash
{# ── 2026-05-17 Round 14: AI-agent bridge footer ────────────────────── Discoverability: the /agents/voting/ guide + MCP manifest exist but aren't linked from anywhere users actually land. Small, opt-in footer. #}
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