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wfmlabsorg/tedlango.com

https://github.com/wfmlabsorg/tedlango.com · scanned 2026-06-16 00:58 UTC (2 months, 1 week ago)

32 raw signals (6 security + 26 graph)

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Complete repo analysis

Last scanned 2 months, 1 week ago · v1 · 30 actionable findings from 2 signal sources. 5 repeated signals grouped for readability. Security checks, system graph analysis, and verified AI-agent feedback are merged into one review queue.

JSON
Combined
95.3
/100
Security checks
95
4 findings
System graph
95
55.6% cov · 26 findings
Critical
1
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Agents
10
0 votes
Crowd
0
reported
Severity distribution — click a segment to filter
Active filters: excluding tests × Reset all
Severity: Critical 1 High 2 Medium 18 Low 7 9-Layer: Software Security Quality Integrity Frontend Hardware Data Network Cicd Source: Security checks 4 System graph 26 Crowd 0 Layer: Quality 16 Security 11 Frontend 2 Cicd 1
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Scan summary Repository scanned at 95.3/100 with 55.6% coverage. It contains 322 nodes across 0 cross-layer flows, written primarily in mixed languages. Engine surfaced 26 findings — concentrated in quality (13), security (10), frontend (2). Risk profile is low: 0 critical, 0 high, 17 medium. Recommended next step: open the quality layer findings first — that's where the highest-impact wins live.

Showing 27 of 30 actionable findings. 35 raw detector signals were grouped into reader-sized issues. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

critical Security checks security auth conf 0.78 Foundry mined security auth guardrail gaps: wfmlabsorg/tedlango.com
Graph query export: Security/auth changes without enough guardrails Query id: security_auth_guardrail_gaps Query type: motif_query Intent: Assumption-check security/auth examples requiring stronger tests or CI. Motif: security_auth_without_guardrails Training usage: assumption_check Graph gold labe…
high Security checks quality Quality conf 0.76 3 occurrences Foundry mined schema ui api mismatch: wfmlabsorg/tedlango.com
Graph query export: Schema, UI, and API mismatch Query id: schema_ui_api_mismatch Query type: motif_query Intent: Assumption-check examples for data-path consistency across layers. Motif: schema_ui_api_mismatch Training usage: assumption_check Graph gold label: supported_by_verification_signal Repo…
3 occurrences
repo-level (3 hits)
high Security checks quality Testing conf 0.78 3 occurrences Foundry mined test ci gap after feedback: wfmlabsorg/tedlango.com
Graph query export: Feedback exposes missing tests or CI Query id: test_ci_gap_after_feedback Query type: motif_query Intent: Hard negatives for feedback/fix chains without adequate guardrails. Motif: test_ci_gap_after_feedback Training usage: hard_negative Graph gold label: supported_by_verificati…
3 occurrences
repo-level (3 hits)
medium Security checks quality Practices conf 0.62 2 occurrences Foundry mined assumption checks: wfmlabsorg/tedlango.com
Comment chain pattern product: assumption_checks Repo: wfmlabsorg/tedlango.com Thread: wfmlabsorg/tedlango.com#4 Outcome: claimed_resolved_unverified Thread label: thread_has_human_issue_and_fix_context Source graph label: github_or_motif_graph_without_source_files Reasons: link_quality_high_confid…
2 occurrences
repo-level (2 hits)
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — static/approach/assets/index-lKKyswDH.js:1
Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — static/js/zumly.js:7
Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — workers/resume-agent/src/index.ts:101
Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — workers/resume-agent/test/eval.ts:76
Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Production readiness conf 1.00 Composite production-readiness gap
Multiple low-cost hardening controls are missing together: license, ci, operator-readme, lockfile. Opus verification showed these co-occurring gaps are a better readiness signal than reading each flag in isolation.
Repo hardeningGenerated repo pattern
medium System graph quality Placeholder conf 1.00 Critical user flow still appears backed by mock or placeholder data
A payment/auth/admin/order/billing-style flow contains mock, fake, TODO, dummy, or placeholder markers in runtime source. In the Fable corpus this is a high-leverage completeness smell: the app can look finished while the money, identity, or tenant flow is still scaffolded.
Mock dataCritical flowGenerated repo pattern
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in layouts/_default/gallery.html:43
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
layouts/_default/gallery.html:43 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in layouts/index.html:482
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
layouts/index.html:482 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in layouts/photography/birds/single.html:76
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
layouts/photography/birds/single.html:76 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in static/approach/assets/index-lKKyswDH.js:2666
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
static/approach/assets/index-lKKyswDH.js:2666 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in static/js/book-mobile.js:116
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
static/js/book-mobile.js:116 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in static/js/book-zoom.js:658
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
static/js/book-zoom.js:658 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in static/js/zumly.js:7
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
static/js/zumly.js:7 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in static/nashville/roi/index.html:809
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
static/nashville/roi/index.html:809 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security Coverage conf 1.00 No auth library detected
The scanner did not find any standard auth library (JWT, OAuth, NextAuth, Auth0, etc.). The repo has auth/admin/session surface indicators, so auth may live in custom code, in a separate service, or be missing.
auth
medium System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 No CI/CD pipelines detected
No GitHub Actions, GitLab CI, or CircleCI configs found. Without CI you can't gate deploys on tests/lints.
CI/CD securityCoverage
low System graph quality Tests conf 1.00 Low test-to-source ratio
1 tests / 5 src (ratio 0.20).
low System graph quality License conf 1.00 No license file detected
No LICENSE/COPYING/NOTICE file was found. Generated repositories often omit licensing, which blocks reuse and automated intake.
Repo hardeningGenerated repo pattern
low System graph quality Docs conf 1.00 No README detected
No README file was found. Generated repos without README context are hard to operate, validate, or safely hand off.
ReadmeRepo hardeningGenerated repo pattern
low System graph quality dependencies conf 1.00 Node manifest has dependencies but no lockfile: workers/resume-agent/package.json
`package.json` declares dependencies, but no same-directory npm/pnpm/yarn/bun lockfile was found. Generated projects without lockfiles are less reproducible and harder to secure-scan precisely.
workers/resume-agent/package.json LockfileReproducibilityGenerated repo pattern
low System graph quality Provenance conf 1.00 Shallow git history limits provenance confidence
The repository is a shallow clone. Origin/evolution analysis cannot distinguish fresh generation, imported legacy code, or long-lived human code with high confidence.
Git historyGenerated repo pattern
low System graph frontend Frontend quality conf 1.00 Stray `console.log` in TS/JS — workers/resume-agent/test/eval.ts:129
Replace with the toast helper, an error boundary, or remove. `console.warn` / `console.error` are acceptable. Why: Hygiene — easy to leak debug output. Rule id: fq.console-leak
Fq console leak
low System graph quality Complexity conf 1.00 Very large file: static/approach/assets/index-lKKyswDH.js (2673 lines)
Files with >800 lines often hide complexity hotspots and discourage tests.
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