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VladChat/sms-dental

https://github.com/VladChat/sms-dental · scanned 2026-06-16 00:52 UTC (2 months, 1 week ago)

138 raw signals (1 security + 137 graph)

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Complete repo analysis

Last scanned 2 months, 1 week ago · v1 · 138 actionable findings from 2 signal sources. 99 repeated signals grouped for readability. Security checks, system graph analysis, and verified AI-agent feedback are merged into one review queue.

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Combined
74.0
/100
Security checks
74
1 findings
System graph
74
100.0% cov · 137 findings
Critical
0
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Agents
10
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Crowd
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Severity distribution — click a segment to filter
Active filters: excluding tests × Reset all
Severity: Critical 0 High 10 Medium 37 Low 4 9-Layer: Software Security Quality Integrity Frontend Hardware Data Network Cicd Source: Security checks 1 System graph 137 Crowd 0 Layer: Quality 119 Api 1 Frontend 1 Security 16 Cicd 1
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Scan summary Repository scanned at 74.0/100 with 100.0% coverage. It contains 2707 nodes across 2 cross-layer flows, written primarily in mixed languages. Engine surfaced 137 findings — concentrated in quality (118), security (16), api (1). Risk profile is high: 0 critical, 9 high, 37 medium. Recommended next step: open the quality layer findings first — that's where the highest-impact wins live.

Showing 51 of 138 actionable findings. 237 raw detector signals were grouped into reader-sized issues. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

high Security checks quality Practices conf 0.84 100 occurrences Foundry mined bad chains: VladChat/sms-dental
Comment chain pattern product: bad_chains Repo: VladChat/sms-dental Thread: VladChat/sms-dental:github-feedback-comment-f9ddbf3515faa307 Outcome: not_resolved_or_not_observed Thread label: thread_has_human_issue_without_fix_context Source graph label: source_backed_multi_signal_graph Reasons: sourc…
100 occurrences
repo-level (100 hits)
high System graph security Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instruction/config may expose a secret: .claude/skills/claude-api/csharp/claude-api.md
Agent-facing files are routinely pasted into LLM/tool contexts. Move literal tokens, keys, and passwords into a secret manager or document them as placeholders only.
.claude/skills/claude-api/csharp/claude-api.md:21 SecretsClaude instruction
high System graph security Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instruction/config may expose a secret: .claude/skills/claude-api/go/managed-agents/README.md
Agent-facing files are routinely pasted into LLM/tool contexts. Move literal tokens, keys, and passwords into a secret manager or document them as placeholders only.
.claude/skills/claude-api/go/managed-agents/README.md:452 SecretsClaude instruction
high System graph security Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instruction/config may expose a secret: .claude/skills/claude-api/java/claude-api.md
Agent-facing files are routinely pasted into LLM/tool contexts. Move literal tokens, keys, and passwords into a secret manager or document them as placeholders only.
.claude/skills/claude-api/java/claude-api.md:20 SecretsClaude instruction
high System graph security Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instruction/config may expose a secret: .claude/skills/claude-api/php/managed-agents/README.md
Agent-facing files are routinely pasted into LLM/tool contexts. Move literal tokens, keys, and passwords into a secret manager or document them as placeholders only.
.claude/skills/claude-api/php/managed-agents/README.md:433 SecretsClaude instruction
high System graph security Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instruction/config may expose a secret: .claude/skills/claude-api/python/claude-api/streaming.md
Agent-facing files are routinely pasted into LLM/tool contexts. Move literal tokens, keys, and passwords into a secret manager or document them as placeholders only.
.claude/skills/claude-api/python/claude-api/streaming.md:114 SecretsClaude instruction
high System graph security Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instruction/config may expose a secret: .claude/skills/claude-api/ruby/managed-agents/README.md
Agent-facing files are routinely pasted into LLM/tool contexts. Move literal tokens, keys, and passwords into a secret manager or document them as placeholders only.
.claude/skills/claude-api/ruby/managed-agents/README.md:309 SecretsClaude instruction
high System graph security Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instruction/config may expose a secret: .claude/skills/claude-api/shared/managed-agents-self-hosted-sandboxes.md
Agent-facing files are routinely pasted into LLM/tool contexts. Move literal tokens, keys, and passwords into a secret manager or document them as placeholders only.
.claude/skills/claude-api/shared/managed-agents-self-hosted-sandboxes.md:42 SecretsClaude instruction
high System graph security Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instruction/config may expose a secret: .claude/skills/claude-api/shared/model-migration.md
Agent-facing files are routinely pasted into LLM/tool contexts. Move literal tokens, keys, and passwords into a secret manager or document them as placeholders only.
.claude/skills/claude-api/shared/model-migration.md:614 SecretsClaude instruction
high System graph security Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instruction/config may expose a secret: .claude/skills/claude-api/SKILL.md
Agent-facing files are routinely pasted into LLM/tool contexts. Move literal tokens, keys, and passwords into a secret manager or document them as placeholders only.
.claude/skills/claude-api/SKILL.md:191 SecretsClaude instruction
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — app/setup/[token]/_components/NumberSearch.tsx:66
Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — app/setup/[token]/_components/SmsApprovalForm.tsx:161
Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — lib/email/setup-link-email.ts:38
Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — lib/email/team-invitation-email.ts:31
Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — lib/twilio/a2p-submission.ts:134
Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — lib/twilio/messaging-service-coverage.ts:15
Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — lib/twilio/numbers.ts:353
Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — lib/twilio/platform-customer-profile.ts:44
Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — lib/twilio/sms-readiness-sync.ts:22
Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent authority lacks a verifier contract: .claude/skills/claude-api/go/managed-agents/README.md
This agent instruction grants code or shell authority but does not state the verification gate that decides promotion. The recurring safe pattern is: LLM proposes; deterministic tests/build/security checks verify; only verified code promotes.
.claude/skills/claude-api/go/managed-agents/README.md VerificationClaude instruction
medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent authority lacks a verifier contract: .claude/skills/claude-api/php/managed-agents/README.md
This agent instruction grants code or shell authority but does not state the verification gate that decides promotion. The recurring safe pattern is: LLM proposes; deterministic tests/build/security checks verify; only verified code promotes.
.claude/skills/claude-api/php/managed-agents/README.md VerificationClaude instruction
medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent authority lacks a verifier contract: .claude/skills/claude-api/python/claude-api/files-api.md
This agent instruction grants code or shell authority but does not state the verification gate that decides promotion. The recurring safe pattern is: LLM proposes; deterministic tests/build/security checks verify; only verified code promotes.
.claude/skills/claude-api/python/claude-api/files-api.md VerificationClaude instruction
medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent authority lacks a verifier contract: .claude/skills/claude-api/python/claude-api/tool-use.md
This agent instruction grants code or shell authority but does not state the verification gate that decides promotion. The recurring safe pattern is: LLM proposes; deterministic tests/build/security checks verify; only verified code promotes.
.claude/skills/claude-api/python/claude-api/tool-use.md VerificationClaude instruction
medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent authority lacks a verifier contract: .claude/skills/claude-api/ruby/managed-agents/README.md
This agent instruction grants code or shell authority but does not state the verification gate that decides promotion. The recurring safe pattern is: LLM proposes; deterministic tests/build/security checks verify; only verified code promotes.
.claude/skills/claude-api/ruby/managed-agents/README.md VerificationClaude instruction
medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent authority lacks a verifier contract: .claude/skills/claude-api/shared/managed-agents-client-patterns.md
This agent instruction grants code or shell authority but does not state the verification gate that decides promotion. The recurring safe pattern is: LLM proposes; deterministic tests/build/security checks verify; only verified code promotes.
.claude/skills/claude-api/shared/managed-agents-client-patterns.md VerificationClaude instruction
medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent authority lacks a verifier contract: .claude/skills/claude-api/shared/managed-agents-core.md
This agent instruction grants code or shell authority but does not state the verification gate that decides promotion. The recurring safe pattern is: LLM proposes; deterministic tests/build/security checks verify; only verified code promotes.
.claude/skills/claude-api/shared/managed-agents-core.md VerificationClaude instruction
medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent authority lacks a verifier contract: .claude/skills/claude-api/shared/managed-agents-environments.md
This agent instruction grants code or shell authority but does not state the verification gate that decides promotion. The recurring safe pattern is: LLM proposes; deterministic tests/build/security checks verify; only verified code promotes.
.claude/skills/claude-api/shared/managed-agents-environments.md VerificationClaude instruction
medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent authority lacks a verifier contract: .claude/skills/claude-api/shared/managed-agents-events.md
This agent instruction grants code or shell authority but does not state the verification gate that decides promotion. The recurring safe pattern is: LLM proposes; deterministic tests/build/security checks verify; only verified code promotes.
.claude/skills/claude-api/shared/managed-agents-events.md VerificationClaude instruction
medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent authority lacks a verifier contract: .claude/skills/claude-api/shared/managed-agents-memory.md
This agent instruction grants code or shell authority but does not state the verification gate that decides promotion. The recurring safe pattern is: LLM proposes; deterministic tests/build/security checks verify; only verified code promotes.
.claude/skills/claude-api/shared/managed-agents-memory.md VerificationClaude instruction
medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent authority lacks a verifier contract: .claude/skills/claude-api/shared/managed-agents-tools.md
This agent instruction grants code or shell authority but does not state the verification gate that decides promotion. The recurring safe pattern is: LLM proposes; deterministic tests/build/security checks verify; only verified code promotes.
.claude/skills/claude-api/shared/managed-agents-tools.md VerificationClaude instruction
medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent authority lacks a verifier contract: .claude/skills/claude-api/shared/models.md
This agent instruction grants code or shell authority but does not state the verification gate that decides promotion. The recurring safe pattern is: LLM proposes; deterministic tests/build/security checks verify; only verified code promotes.
.claude/skills/claude-api/shared/models.md VerificationClaude instruction
medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent authority lacks a verifier contract: .claude/skills/claude-api/typescript/claude-api/files-api.md
This agent instruction grants code or shell authority but does not state the verification gate that decides promotion. The recurring safe pattern is: LLM proposes; deterministic tests/build/security checks verify; only verified code promotes.
.claude/skills/claude-api/typescript/claude-api/files-api.md VerificationClaude instruction
medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent authority lacks a verifier contract: .claude/skills/claude-api/typescript/claude-api/streaming.md
This agent instruction grants code or shell authority but does not state the verification gate that decides promotion. The recurring safe pattern is: LLM proposes; deterministic tests/build/security checks verify; only verified code promotes.
.claude/skills/claude-api/typescript/claude-api/streaming.md VerificationClaude instruction
medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent authority lacks a verifier contract: .claude/skills/claude-api/typescript/claude-api/tool-use.md
This agent instruction grants code or shell authority but does not state the verification gate that decides promotion. The recurring safe pattern is: LLM proposes; deterministic tests/build/security checks verify; only verified code promotes.
.claude/skills/claude-api/typescript/claude-api/tool-use.md VerificationClaude instruction
medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent authority lacks a verifier contract: .claude/skills/claude-automation-recommender/references/plugins-reference.md
This agent instruction grants code or shell authority but does not state the verification gate that decides promotion. The recurring safe pattern is: LLM proposes; deterministic tests/build/security checks verify; only verified code promotes.
.claude/skills/claude-automation-recommender/references/plugins-reference.md VerificationClaude instruction
medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instructions exist but release-hardening basics are missing
AI-coder instruction files were found, but the repo is missing ci. Treat this as a contract gap: the agent is guided, but the generated output is not yet guarded by the controls that make it repeatable.
Repo hardeningGenerated repo pattern
medium System graph quality Placeholder conf 1.00 Critical user flow still appears backed by mock or placeholder data
A payment/auth/admin/order/billing-style flow contains mock, fake, TODO, dummy, or placeholder markers in runtime source. In the Fable corpus this is a high-leverage completeness smell: the app can look finished while the money, identity, or tenant flow is still scaffolded.
Mock dataCritical flowGenerated repo pattern
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in design/recall/design-system.html:330
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
design/recall/design-system.html:330 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in design/recall/icons.js:3
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
design/recall/icons.js:3 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in design/recall/screens/app.html:215
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
design/recall/screens/app.html:215 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in design/recall/screens/auth.html:114
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
design/recall/screens/auth.html:114 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in design/recall/screens/compliance.html:107
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
design/recall/screens/compliance.html:107 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in design/recall/screens/marketing.html:181
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
design/recall/screens/marketing.html:181 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in design/recall/screens/onboarding.html:123
Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.
design/recall/screens/onboarding.html:123 Direct innerhtml assignment
medium System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 No CI/CD pipelines detected
No GitHub Actions, GitLab CI, or CircleCI configs found. Without CI you can't gate deploys on tests/lints.
CI/CD securityCoverage
medium System graph quality Placeholder conf 1.00 Placeholder or mock-heavy implementation detected
Found 215 placeholder/mock markers across 45 source files. This often means the repo looks complete while core flows still use generated scaffolding or fake data.
Mock dataIncompleteGenerated repo pattern
medium System graph quality Placeholder conf 1.00 Runtime service client appears to use placeholder configuration
A runtime source file appears to wire Supabase/Firebase/AI/payment-style clients to placeholder URLs, keys, or fallback values. In the Fable corpus this often means the UI/API shape is present while the backend service is not actually configured.
Runtime configService clientGenerated repo pattern
low System graph quality Tests conf 1.00 Low test-to-source ratio
42 tests / 298 src (ratio 0.14).
low System graph quality Provenance conf 1.00 Shallow git history limits provenance confidence
The repository is a shallow clone. Origin/evolution analysis cannot distinguish fresh generation, imported legacy code, or long-lived human code with high confidence.
Git historyGenerated repo pattern
low System graph frontend Frontend quality conf 1.00 Stray `console.log` in TS/JS — lib/logging/logger.ts:38
Replace with the toast helper, an error boundary, or remove. `console.warn` / `console.error` are acceptable. Why: Hygiene — easy to leak debug output. Rule id: fq.console-leak
Fq console leak
low System graph quality Complexity conf 1.00 Very large file: app/admin/(console)/clinics/[clinicId]/_components/AdminA2pReviewPanel.tsx (1663 lines)
Files with >800 lines often hide complexity hotspots and discourage tests.
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