Public scan — anyone with this URL can view this analysis. Sign up to track your own repos privately, run scheduled re-scans, and get AI fix prompts via your dashboard.

tdb-project/tdb-community

https://github.com/tdb-project/tdb-community · scanned 2026-06-16 00:30 UTC (2 months, 2 weeks ago)

22 raw signals (0 security + 22 graph)

UNIFIED Repobility · multi-layer engine · AI coders

Complete repo analysis

Last scanned 2 months, 2 weeks ago · v1 · 16 actionable findings from 1 signal source. 6 repeated signals grouped for readability. Security checks, system graph analysis, and verified AI-agent feedback are merged into one review queue.

JSON
Severity distribution — click a segment to filter
Active filters: excluding tests × Reset all
Corpus Intelligence Cross-corpus context (cohort percentile, top patterns, fix plan) is shown only on repositories you own. Sign up and connect your repo to view it.
Scan summary Repository scanned at 69.1/100 with 100.0% coverage. It contains 242 nodes across 6 cross-layer flows, written primarily in mixed languages. Engine surfaced 22 findings — concentrated in cicd (9), api (5), quality (3). Risk profile is high: 0 critical, 1 high, 8 medium. Recommended next step: open the cicd layer findings first — that's where the highest-impact wins live.

Showing 13 of 16 actionable findings. 22 raw detector signals were grouped into reader-sized issues. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

high System graph security auth conf 1.00 FastAPI POST `mcp_endpoint` without auth dependency — src/tdb/routers/mcp.py:188
`@router.post` decorator with no `Depends(get_current_user)` or auth-shaped dependency in its signature. Mutating endpoints should require authentication unless explicitly public.
src/tdb/routers/mcp.py:188 securityAuth fastapi unauth mutation
medium System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 7 occurrences GitHub Action is tag-pinned rather than SHA-pinned
github/codeql-action/init@v4 can move without a code change in this repo. Pin third-party actions to a reviewed 40-character commit SHA.
2 files, 7 locations
.github/workflows/publish.yml:23, 31, 49, 52, 55 (5 hits)
.github/workflows/codeql.yml:24, 29 (2 hits)
CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions
medium System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 GitHub Actions workflow grants broad write permissions
CI tokens with write permissions increase blast radius when an action, dependency, or PR workflow is compromised. Prefer job-level least-privilege permissions.
.github/workflows/publish.yml CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions
low System graph hardware Coverage conf 1.00 Containers defined but no K8s/orchestration manifest found
Repo has Dockerfiles/compose but no Kubernetes/Nomad manifests. If the target deployment is K8s, the manifests may live in a separate ops repo.
Deployment
low System graph hardware Supply chain conf 1.00 Docker base image is tag-pinned but not digest-pinned: python:3.12-slim
Container tags can be retagged upstream. Pin production base images to a reviewed digest (`image@sha256:...`) when reproducibility and supply-chain integrity matter.
Dockerfile:1 containersPinned dependencies
low System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 GitHub Action is tag-pinned rather than SHA-pinned
actions/setup-python@v6 can move without a code change in this repo. Pin third-party actions to a reviewed 40-character commit SHA.
.github/workflows/ci.yml:16 CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions
low System graph software Dead code conf 1.00 Possibly dead Python function: require_api_key
No callers detected by AST scan in this repo. Could be exported for external callers or a framework handler.
src/tdb/auth/apikey.py:9
low System graph quality Provenance conf 1.00 Shallow git history limits provenance confidence
The repository is a shallow clone. Origin/evolution analysis cannot distinguish fresh generation, imported legacy code, or long-lived human code with high confidence.
Git historyGenerated repo pattern
low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: DELETE /{source_id}
`src/tdb/routers/sources.py` declares `DELETE /{source_id}` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes it.
Unused endpoint
low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: GET /
`src/tdb/main.py` declares `GET /` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes it.
Unused endpoint
low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: GET /{source_id}
`src/tdb/routers/sources.py` declares `GET /{source_id}` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes it.
Unused endpoint
low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: GET /{source_id}/schema
`src/tdb/routers/sources.py` declares `GET /{source_id}/schema` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes it.
Unused endpoint
low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: POST /
`src/tdb/routers/query.py` declares `POST /` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes it.
Unused endpoint
For AI agents: Voting guide (TP/FP) MCP manifest Stdio wrapper SARIF Integrate Findings queue Vote TP/FP on findings to calibrate the engine.
For AI agents + API integrations
Email me when this repo regresses
Free. We re-scan periodically; new criticals → your inbox. No signup required for the scan itself.
API access

This page is publicly accessible at: https://repobility.com/scan/fc1c26d8-038c-4843-b29c-5d31b4b0c6b8/

To check status programmatically (no auth required):

curl -s https://repobility.com/api/v1/public/scan/fc1c26d8-038c-4843-b29c-5d31b4b0c6b8/

Important — please don't re-submit the same URL repeatedly. The submission endpoint is idempotent: re-submitting the same git URL returns this same scan_token, not a new one. To re-scan this repo, sign up free and use the dashboard.