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openhuman

https://github.com/tinyhumansai/openhuman · scanned 2026-05-16 19:45 UTC (23 hours, 39 minutes ago) · 10 languages

962 findings (72 legacy + 890 scanner) 8/10 scanners ran Scanner says 79 (higher by 5)

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UNIFIED Repobility · multi-layer engine · AI coders

Complete repo analysis

Last scanned 23 hours, 39 minutes ago · v2 · 517 findings from 2 sources. Findings combine the legacy security pipeline AND the multi-layer engine (atlas, wiring, flows, ranked) AND verified AI agent contributions.

JSON
Combined
84.3
/100
Repobility
90
72 legacy
9-layer
79
100.0% cov · 445 gaps
Critical
2
click to filter
Agents
6
0 votes
Crowd
0
reported
Severity distribution — click a segment to filter
Active filters: severity: high × excluding tests × Reset all
Severity: Critical 2 High 15 Medium 108 Low 271 Source: Legacy 72 9-layer 445 Crowd 0 Layer: Security 17 Quality 201 Software 54 Cicd 157 Api 1 Frontend 77 Hardware 10
Scan summary Repository scanned at 78.9/100 with 100.0% coverage. It contains 5685 nodes across 30 cross-layer flows, written primarily in mixed languages. Engine surfaced 445 findings — concentrated in quality (160), cicd (147), frontend (77). Risk profile is high: 0 critical, 3 high, 86 medium. Recommended next step: open the quality layer findings first — that's where the highest-impact wins live.

Showing 15 of 517 findings. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

high Legacy security credential_exposure conf 1.00 [SEC018] AI-Agent Secret Retrieval Command: A command that prints or embeds credentials was committed. AI coding agents often add these commands while trying to help with setup or deployment, but they can leak live secrets through logs, shell history, CI output, or documentation.
Remove the command, use a secret manager or CI masked secret, and rotate any credential that may have been printed.
scripts/act-staging.sh:127 credential_exposurelegacy
high Legacy security credential_exposure conf 1.00 [SEC018] AI-Agent Secret Retrieval Command: A command that prints or embeds credentials was committed. AI coding agents often add these commands while trying to help with setup or deployment, but they can leak live secrets through logs, shell history, CI output, or documentation.
Remove the command, use a secret manager or CI masked secret, and rotate any credential that may have been printed.
scripts/act-build-desktop.sh:72 credential_exposurelegacy
high Legacy software ssrf conf 1.00 [SEC029] Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) — outbound HTTP from user input: Outbound HTTP request to a user-controlled URL without allowlist validation. Attackers can probe internal services (169.254.169.254 metadata, internal Kubernetes endpoints, file:// URIs), exfiltrate data, or pivot through your network. SSRF is OWASP A10:2021 and a frequent foothold in cloud breaches.
Validate the URL against an allowlist BEFORE fetching: ALLOWED = {'images.example.com', 'cdn.example.com'} host = urlparse(url).hostname if host not in ALLOWED: abort(400) Or use a server-side proxy (Imgproxy / serve-files-only-from-S3) that isolates outbound network access from the request h…
app/src-tauri/src/webview_accounts/runtime.js:440 ssrflegacy
high Legacy software ssrf conf 1.00 [SEC029] Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) — outbound HTTP from user input: Outbound HTTP request to a user-controlled URL without allowlist validation. Attackers can probe internal services (169.254.169.254 metadata, internal Kubernetes endpoints, file:// URIs), exfiltrate data, or pivot through your network. SSRF is OWASP A10:2021 and a frequent foothold in cloud breaches.
Validate the URL against an allowlist BEFORE fetching: ALLOWED = {'images.example.com', 'cdn.example.com'} host = urlparse(url).hostname if host not in ALLOWED: abort(400) Or use a server-side proxy (Imgproxy / serve-files-only-from-S3) that isolates outbound network access from the request h…
app/src-tauri/src/webview_accounts/mod.rs:49 ssrflegacy
high Legacy software ssrf conf 1.00 [SEC029] Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) — outbound HTTP from user input: Outbound HTTP request to a user-controlled URL without allowlist validation. Attackers can probe internal services (169.254.169.254 metadata, internal Kubernetes endpoints, file:// URIs), exfiltrate data, or pivot through your network. SSRF is OWASP A10:2021 and a frequent foothold in cloud breaches.
Validate the URL against an allowlist BEFORE fetching: ALLOWED = {'images.example.com', 'cdn.example.com'} host = urlparse(url).hostname if host not in ALLOWED: abort(400) Or use a server-side proxy (Imgproxy / serve-files-only-from-S3) that isolates outbound network access from the request h…
app/src-tauri/src/cdp/session.rs:90 ssrflegacy
high Legacy security auth conf 0.78 Consent is collected in UI without visible backend audit persistence
Persist consent as a backend record with subject, actor, purpose, scope, legal text version, timestamp, IP address, user agent, and revocation state.
app/src/components/composio/ComposioConnectModal.tsx:741 authlegacy
high Legacy cicd docker conf 0.92 Dockerfile pipes a remote script into a shell
Download the artifact, verify its checksum or signature, pin the version, and then execute it.
e2e/Dockerfile:35 dockerlegacy
high Legacy cicd docker conf 0.92 Dockerfile pipes a remote script into a shell
Download the artifact, verify its checksum or signature, pin the version, and then execute it.
e2e/Dockerfile:30 dockerlegacy
high Legacy cicd docker conf 0.92 Dockerfile pipes a remote script into a shell
Download the artifact, verify its checksum or signature, pin the version, and then execute it.
.github/Dockerfile:52 dockerlegacy
high Legacy cicd docker conf 0.92 Dockerfile pipes a remote script into a shell
Download the artifact, verify its checksum or signature, pin the version, and then execute it.
.github/Dockerfile:46 dockerlegacy
high Legacy security auth conf 0.83 Secret-like setting is echoed into a password input value
Never prefill secret fields with stored values. Show a masked status such as configured/not configured, require explicit rotation to replace the value, and return the raw key only once at creation time.
app/src/components/settings/panels/ComposioPanel.tsx:291 authlegacy
high Legacy security auth conf 0.83 Secret-like setting is echoed into a password input value
Never prefill secret fields with stored values. Show a masked status such as configured/not configured, require explicit rotation to replace the value, and return the raw key only once at creation time.
app/src/components/settings/panels/AIPanel.tsx:1285 authlegacy
high 9-layer hardware supply-chain conf 1.00 Dockerfile pipes a remote installer into a shell
Executing downloaded code during image build gives the remote endpoint build-time code execution. Prefer pinned packages or verify downloaded installers by checksum/signature.
.github/Dockerfile:46 supply-chaindockerremote-installer
high 9-layer hardware supply-chain conf 1.00 Dockerfile pipes a remote installer into a shell
Executing downloaded code during image build gives the remote endpoint build-time code execution. Prefer pinned packages or verify downloaded installers by checksum/signature.
.github/Dockerfile:52 supply-chaindockerremote-installer
high 9-layer hardware supply-chain conf 1.00 Dockerfile pipes a remote installer into a shell
Executing downloaded code during image build gives the remote endpoint build-time code execution. Prefer pinned packages or verify downloaded installers by checksum/signature.
e2e/Dockerfile:35 supply-chaindockerremote-installer
{# ── 2026-05-17 Round 14: AI-agent bridge footer ────────────────────── Discoverability: the /agents/voting/ guide + MCP manifest exist but aren't linked from anywhere users actually land. Small, opt-in footer. #}
For AI agents: Voting guide (TP/FP) MCP manifest Stdio wrapper SARIF Integrate Findings queue Vote TP/FP on findings to calibrate the engine.
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