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runlegion/legion

https://github.com/runlegion/legion · scanned 2026-06-15 23:57 UTC (2 months, 3 weeks ago)

24 raw signals (0 security + 24 graph)

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Complete repo analysis

Last scanned 2 months, 3 weeks ago · v1 · 23 actionable findings from 1 signal source. 1 repeated signal grouped for readability. Security checks, system graph analysis, and verified AI-agent feedback are merged into one review queue.

JSON
Combined
53.2
/100
Security checks
53
0 findings
System graph
53
77.8% cov · 23 findings
Critical
0
click to filter
Agents
10
0 votes
Crowd
0
reported
Severity distribution — click a segment to filter
Active filters: excluding tests × Reset all
Severity: Critical 0 High 1 Medium 7 Low 12 9-Layer: Software Security Quality Integrity Frontend Hardware Data Network Cicd Source: Security checks 0 System graph 23 Crowd 0 Layer: Frontend 2 Cicd 3 Quality 13 Security 1 Api 4
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Scan summary Repository scanned at 53.2/100 with 77.8% coverage. It contains 425 nodes across 4 cross-layer flows, written primarily in mixed languages. Engine surfaced 24 findings — concentrated in quality (13), cicd (4), api (4). Risk profile is high: 0 critical, 1 high, 7 medium. Recommended next step: open the quality layer findings first — that's where the highest-impact wins live.

Showing 20 of 23 actionable findings. 24 raw detector signals were grouped into reader-sized issues. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

high System graph security Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instruction/config may expose a secret: .claude/agents/rust.md
Agent-facing files are routinely pasted into LLM/tool contexts. Move literal tokens, keys, and passwords into a secret manager or document them as placeholders only.
.claude/agents/rust.md:26 SecretsClaude instruction
medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — static/app.js:68
Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.
runtime safetyRobustness
medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent authority lacks a verifier contract: app/.mcp.json
This agent instruction grants code or shell authority but does not state the verification gate that decides promotion. The recurring safe pattern is: LLM proposes; deterministic tests/build/security checks verify; only verified code promotes.
app/.mcp.json VerificationMcp config
medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent authority lacks a verifier contract: plugin/skills/legion-memory/SKILL.md
This agent instruction grants code or shell authority but does not state the verification gate that decides promotion. The recurring safe pattern is: LLM proposes; deterministic tests/build/security checks verify; only verified code promotes.
plugin/skills/legion-memory/SKILL.md VerificationSkill file
medium System graph quality Placeholder conf 1.00 Critical user flow still appears backed by mock or placeholder data
A payment/auth/admin/order/billing-style flow contains mock, fake, TODO, dummy, or placeholder markers in runtime source. In the Fable corpus this is a high-leverage completeness smell: the app can look finished while the money, identity, or tenant flow is still scaffolded.
Mock dataCritical flowGenerated repo pattern
medium System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 GitHub Action is tag-pinned rather than SHA-pinned
softprops/action-gh-release@v3 can move without a code change in this repo. Pin third-party actions to a reviewed 40-character commit SHA.
.github/workflows/release.yml:88 CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions
medium System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 GitHub Actions workflow grants broad write permissions
CI tokens with write permissions increase blast radius when an action, dependency, or PR workflow is compromised. Prefer job-level least-privilege permissions.
.github/workflows/release.yml CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions
medium System graph quality Placeholder conf 1.00 Placeholder or mock-heavy implementation detected
Found 61 placeholder/mock markers across 24 source files. This often means the repo looks complete while core flows still use generated scaffolding or fake data.
Mock dataIncompleteGenerated repo pattern
low System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 2 occurrences GitHub Action is tag-pinned rather than SHA-pinned
actions/upload-artifact@v6 can move without a code change in this repo. Pin third-party actions to a reviewed 40-character commit SHA.
lines 62, 77
.github/workflows/release.yml:62, 77 (2 hits)
CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions
low System graph quality Tests conf 1.00 Low test-to-source ratio
19 tests / 126 src (ratio 0.15).
low System graph quality Provenance conf 1.00 Shallow git history limits provenance confidence
The repository is a shallow clone. Origin/evolution analysis cannot distinguish fresh generation, imported legacy code, or long-lived human code with high confidence.
Git historyGenerated repo pattern
low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: GET /api/agents
`app/src/services/http-adapter.ts` declares `GET /api/agents` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes it.
Unused endpoint
low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: GET /api/schedules
`app/src/services/http-adapter.ts` declares `GET /api/schedules` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes it.
Unused endpoint
low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: GET /api/signals
`app/src/services/http-adapter.ts` declares `GET /api/signals` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes it.
Unused endpoint
low System graph api Wiring conf 1.00 Unused endpoint: GET /api/tasks
`app/src/services/http-adapter.ts` declares `GET /api/tasks` but no frontend code we scanned calls it. This is fine if the endpoint serves external clients (mobile app, third-party, server-side webhooks). Otherwise it's dead code — consider removing or documenting who consumes it.
Unused endpoint
low System graph quality Complexity conf 1.00 Very large file: src/db/board.rs (1445 lines)
Files with >800 lines often hide complexity hotspots and discourage tests.
low System graph quality Complexity conf 1.00 Very large file: src/db/kanban.rs (1586 lines)
Files with >800 lines often hide complexity hotspots and discourage tests.
low System graph quality Complexity conf 1.00 Very large file: src/db/sync.rs (1746 lines)
Files with >800 lines often hide complexity hotspots and discourage tests.
low System graph quality Complexity conf 1.00 Very large file: src/db/wake.rs (1277 lines)
Files with >800 lines often hide complexity hotspots and discourage tests.
low System graph quality Complexity conf 1.00 Very large file: src/spec_gen.rs (1358 lines)
Files with >800 lines often hide complexity hotspots and discourage tests.
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