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SuarezPM/apohara-themis

https://github.com/SuarezPM/apohara-themis · scanned 2026-06-16 00:24 UTC (2 months, 2 weeks ago)

26 raw signals (0 security + 26 graph)

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Complete repo analysis

Last scanned 2 months, 2 weeks ago · v1 · 21 actionable findings from 1 signal source. 5 repeated signals grouped for readability. Security checks, system graph analysis, and verified AI-agent feedback are merged into one review queue.

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88.9% cov · 21 findings

Severity distribution — click a segment to filter

Active filters: excluding tests × Reset all

Severity: Critical 0 High 1 Medium 8 Low 9 9-Layer: Software Security Quality Integrity Frontend Hardware Data Network Cicd Source: Security checks 0 System graph 21 Crowd 0 Layer: Software 2 Hardware 3 Frontend 1 Security 3 Cicd 3 Quality 9

Exclude dismissed / FP Exclude test files

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Scan summary Repository scanned at 58.0/100 with 88.9% coverage. It contains 218 nodes across 0 cross-layer flows, written primarily in mixed languages. Engine surfaced 26 findings — concentrated in quality (9), cicd (8), hardware (3). Risk profile is high: 0 critical, 1 high, 13 medium. Recommended next step: open the quality layer findings first — that's where the highest-impact wins live.

Showing 18 of 21 actionable findings. 26 raw detector signals were grouped into reader-sized issues. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

high System graph security Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent instruction/config may expose a secret: .claude/rules/security.md

Agent-facing files are routinely pasted into LLM/tool contexts. Move literal tokens, keys, and passwords into a secret manager or document them as placeholders only.

.claude/rules/security.md:21 SecretsClaude instruction

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — crates/themis-frontend/static/app.js:318

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent authority lacks a verifier contract: .claude/settings.json

This agent instruction grants code or shell authority but does not state the verification gate that decides promotion. The recurring safe pattern is: LLM proposes; deterministic tests/build/security checks verify; only verified code promotes.

.claude/settings.json VerificationClaude instruction

medium System graph quality Placeholder conf 1.00 Critical user flow still appears backed by mock or placeholder data

A payment/auth/admin/order/billing-style flow contains mock, fake, TODO, dummy, or placeholder markers in runtime source. In the Fable corpus this is a high-leverage completeness smell: the app can look finished while the money, identity, or tenant flow is still scaffolded.

Mock dataCritical flowGenerated repo pattern

medium System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 3 occurrences GitHub Action is tag-pinned rather than SHA-pinned

softprops/action-gh-release@v2 can move without a code change in this repo. Pin third-party actions to a reviewed 40-character commit SHA.

2 files, 3 locations

.github/workflows/scorecard.yml:38, 50 (2 hits)

.github/workflows/release.yml:41

CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions

medium System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 4 occurrences GitHub Actions workflow grants broad write permissions

CI tokens with write permissions increase blast radius when an action, dependency, or PR workflow is compromised. Prefer job-level least-privilege permissions.

4 files, 4 locations

.github/workflows/publish-npm.yml

.github/workflows/publish.yml

.github/workflows/release.yml

.github/workflows/scorecard.yml

CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions

medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in crates/themis-frontend/static/app.js:44

Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.

crates/themis-frontend/static/app.js:44 Direct innerhtml assignment

medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'node_child_process' in scripts/verify-themis.mjs:10

Found a known-risky pattern (node_child_process). Review and replace if possible.

scripts/verify-themis.mjs:10 Node child process

medium System graph quality Placeholder conf 1.00 Placeholder or mock-heavy implementation detected

Found 150 placeholder/mock markers across 25 source files. This often means the repo looks complete while core flows still use generated scaffolding or fake data.

Mock dataIncompleteGenerated repo pattern

low System graph hardware Coverage conf 1.00 Containers defined but no K8s/orchestration manifest found

Repo has Dockerfiles/compose but no Kubernetes/Nomad manifests. If the target deployment is K8s, the manifests may live in a separate ops repo.

Deployment

low System graph quality Debug conf 1.00 Debug logging residue appears in source files

Found 54 console/debugger/print-style debug statements in non-test source. This is a common fast-generation residue before production cleanup.

CleanupRepo hardeningGenerated repo pattern

low System graph hardware Supply chain conf 1.00 Docker base image is tag-pinned but not digest-pinned: debian:bookworm-slim

Container tags can be retagged upstream. Pin production base images to a reviewed digest (`image@sha256:...`) when reproducibility and supply-chain integrity matter.

Dockerfile:31 containersPinned dependencies

low System graph hardware Supply chain conf 1.00 Docker base image is tag-pinned but not digest-pinned: rust:1.88-slim-bookworm

Container tags can be retagged upstream. Pin production base images to a reviewed digest (`image@sha256:...`) when reproducibility and supply-chain integrity matter.

Dockerfile:9 containersPinned dependencies

low System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 GitHub Action is tag-pinned rather than SHA-pinned

actions/checkout@v4 can move without a code change in this repo. Pin third-party actions to a reviewed 40-character commit SHA.

.github/workflows/scorecard.yml:33 CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions

low System graph quality Tests conf 1.00 Low test-to-source ratio

8 tests / 50 src (ratio 0.16).

low System graph software Dead code conf 1.00 Possibly dead Python function: expand

No callers detected by AST scan in this repo. Could be exported for external callers or a framework handler.

scripts/render_agent_config.py:26

low System graph software Dead code conf 1.00 Possibly dead Python function: find_room_by_participant_count

No callers detected by AST scan in this repo. Could be exported for external callers or a framework handler.

scripts/themis-bootstrap.py:116

low System graph quality Provenance conf 1.00 Shallow git history limits provenance confidence

The repository is a shallow clone. Origin/evolution analysis cannot distinguish fresh generation, imported legacy code, or long-lived human code with high confidence.

Git historyGenerated repo pattern

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