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SuarezPM/apohara-themis

https://github.com/SuarezPM/apohara-themis · scanned 2026-06-16 00:24 UTC (2 months, 2 weeks ago)

26 raw signals (0 security + 26 graph)

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Complete repo analysis

Last scanned 2 months, 2 weeks ago · v1 · 21 actionable findings from 1 signal source. 5 repeated signals grouped for readability. Security checks, system graph analysis, and verified AI-agent feedback are merged into one review queue.

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88.9% cov · 21 findings

Severity distribution — click a segment to filter

Active filters: severity: medium × excluding tests × Reset all

Severity: Critical 0 High 1 Medium 8 Low 9 9-Layer: Software Security Quality Integrity Frontend Hardware Data Network Cicd Source: Security checks 0 System graph 21 Crowd 0 Layer: Software 2 Hardware 3 Frontend 1 Security 3 Cicd 3 Quality 9

Exclude dismissed / FP Exclude test files

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Scan summary Repository scanned at 58.0/100 with 88.9% coverage. It contains 218 nodes across 0 cross-layer flows, written primarily in mixed languages. Engine surfaced 26 findings — concentrated in quality (9), cicd (8), hardware (3). Risk profile is high: 0 critical, 1 high, 13 medium. Recommended next step: open the quality layer findings first — that's where the highest-impact wins live.

Showing 8 of 21 actionable findings. 26 raw detector signals were grouped into reader-sized issues. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

medium System graph quality Integrity conf 1.00 `fetch()` without try/.catch or AbortSignal — crates/themis-frontend/static/app.js:318

Bare `fetch(...)` will throw an unhandled rejection on network failure. Wrap in try/catch, attach a `.catch(...)`, or pass an AbortSignal with a timeout.

runtime safetyRobustness

medium System graph quality Agent instructions conf 1.00 Agent authority lacks a verifier contract: .claude/settings.json

This agent instruction grants code or shell authority but does not state the verification gate that decides promotion. The recurring safe pattern is: LLM proposes; deterministic tests/build/security checks verify; only verified code promotes.

.claude/settings.json VerificationClaude instruction

medium System graph quality Placeholder conf 1.00 Critical user flow still appears backed by mock or placeholder data

A payment/auth/admin/order/billing-style flow contains mock, fake, TODO, dummy, or placeholder markers in runtime source. In the Fable corpus this is a high-leverage completeness smell: the app can look finished while the money, identity, or tenant flow is still scaffolded.

Mock dataCritical flowGenerated repo pattern

medium System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 3 occurrences GitHub Action is tag-pinned rather than SHA-pinned

softprops/action-gh-release@v2 can move without a code change in this repo. Pin third-party actions to a reviewed 40-character commit SHA.

2 files, 3 locations

.github/workflows/scorecard.yml:38, 50 (2 hits)

.github/workflows/release.yml:41

CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions

medium System graph cicd CI/CD security conf 1.00 4 occurrences GitHub Actions workflow grants broad write permissions

CI tokens with write permissions increase blast radius when an action, dependency, or PR workflow is compromised. Prefer job-level least-privilege permissions.

4 files, 4 locations

.github/workflows/publish-npm.yml

.github/workflows/publish.yml

.github/workflows/release.yml

.github/workflows/scorecard.yml

CI/CD securitySupply chainGithub actions

medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'direct_innerhtml_assignment' in crates/themis-frontend/static/app.js:44

Found a known-risky pattern (direct_innerhtml_assignment). Review and replace if possible.

crates/themis-frontend/static/app.js:44 Direct innerhtml assignment

medium System graph security security conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'node_child_process' in scripts/verify-themis.mjs:10

Found a known-risky pattern (node_child_process). Review and replace if possible.

scripts/verify-themis.mjs:10 Node child process

medium System graph quality Placeholder conf 1.00 Placeholder or mock-heavy implementation detected

Found 150 placeholder/mock markers across 25 source files. This often means the repo looks complete while core flows still use generated scaffolding or fake data.

Mock dataIncompleteGenerated repo pattern

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