strapi/documentation

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70 of your 97 findings came from Repobility's proprietary detections. ✓ Repobility tags below mark them.

https://github.com/strapi/documentation · scanned 2026-06-05 14:25 UTC (5 days, 4 hours ago) · 10 languages

87 findings 11/13 scanners ran 39th percentile · Javascript · small (2-20K LoC)

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UNIFIED Repobility · multi-layer engine · AI coders

Complete repo analysis

25 actionable findings from 1 signal source. 62 repeated signals grouped for readability. Security checks, system graph analysis, and verified AI-agent feedback are merged into one review queue.

Deeper analysis is still running. Current findings may grow as the 9-layer scanner finishes. This page refreshes automatically so the final totals replace the partial view.

Score breakdown â 2026-05-18-v5

Component	Sub-score	Weight	Contribution
`structure_score`	40.0	0.15	6.00
`security_score`	100.0	0.25	25.00
`testing_score`	0.0	0.20	0.00
`documentation_score`	61.0	0.15	9.15
`practices_score`	59.0	0.15	8.85
`code_quality`	80.0	0.10	8.00
Overall		1.00	57.0

security_score may be inflated — optional security scanners were skipped on this fast scan

Severity distribution — click a segment to filter

Active filters: excluding tests × Reset all

Severity: Critical 5 High 1 Medium 3 Low 2 9-Layer: Software Security Quality Integrity Frontend Hardware Data Network Cicd Source: Security checks 25 System graph 0 Crowd 0 Layer: Quality 14 Security 2 Cicd 4 Software 5

Exclude dismissed / FP Exclude test files

Showing 11 of 25 actionable findings. 87 raw detector signals were grouped into reader-sized issues. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

critical Security checks quality Quality conf 1.00 ✓ Repobility 3 occurrences [MINED024] Js Eval Usage: eval() executes arbitrary code. Code injection risk.

Review and fix per the pattern semantics. See CWE-95 / for context.

3 files, 3 locations

docusaurus/scripts/redirects-utilities/docusaurus-vercel-converter/docusaurus-vercel-converter.js:58

docusaurus/scripts/redirects-utilities/redirects-organizer/redirects-organizer.js:87

docusaurus/scripts/redirects-utilities/remove-redirects-vercel-duplicates/compare-redirects-and-vercel.js:24

critical Security checks quality Quality conf 1.00 ✓ Repobility [MINED035] Js New Function: new Function(...) compiles strings to functions.

Review and fix per the pattern semantics. See CWE-95 / for context.

docusaurus/scripts/validate-open-with-translated-prompts.js:16

critical Security checks software dependencies conf 0.90 ✓ Repobility [MINED125] GHA script injection via github.event.pull_request.head.ref in run-step: Multi-line `run: |` block interpolates ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.ref }} into shell. PR title/body/branch/comment fields are attacker-controllable.

Capture the field into an env var first; reference $ENV_VAR in shell.

.github/workflows/credit-reward-automation.yml:19

Capture the field into an env var first; reference $ENV_VAR in shell.

.github/workflows/sync-content-to-next.yml:92

critical Security checks software dependencies conf 0.90 ✓ Repobility 9 occurrences [MINED125] GHA script injection via github.event.pull_request.title in run-step: Multi-line `run: |` block interpolates ${{ github.event.pull_request.title }} into shell. PR title/body/branch/comment fields are attacker-controllable.

Capture the field into an env var first; reference $ENV_VAR in shell.

2 files, 9 locations

.github/workflows/sync-content-to-next.yml:26, 84, 91, 165, 172, 278, 329, 353 (8 hits)

.github/workflows/credit-reward-automation.yml:100

low Security checks cicd CI/CD security conf 0.35 ✓ Repobility 15 occurrences Workflow references repository secrets in a pull_request workflow

Fork pull_request runs do not receive normal repository secrets on GitHub Actions. Review this as a reliability/intent signal, not as direct fork-secret exfiltration. Raise severity only for pull_request_target or another trusted-context path that runs untrusted PR code with secrets.

2 files, 15 locations

.github/workflows/sync-content-to-next.yml:44, 158, 183, 199, 271, 311, 322, 347, +3 more (11 hits)

.github/workflows/meilisearch-scraper.yml:36, 37, 48, 49 (4 hits)

CI/CD securityworkflow secretsGitHub Actions

low Security checks cicd CI/CD security conf 0.90 ✓ Repobility 21 occurrences GitHub Action is tag-pinned rather than SHA-pinned

[MINED115] Action `actions/checkout` pinned to mutable ref `@v4`: `uses: actions/checkout@v4` resolves at workflow-run time. Tags and branches can be re-pushed by the action owner; that made the tj-actions/changed-files compromise (2025) instantly affect ~23K repos. Pin to a 40-char commit SHA + lo…

10 files, 21 locations

.github/workflows/documentation-style-review-enhanced.yml:42, 47, 99, 370 (4 hits)

.github/workflows/debug-review.yml:16, 19, 106 (3 hits)

.github/workflows/documentation-review-github.yml:37, 42, 94 (3 hits)

.github/workflows/sync-content-to-next.yml:42, 196, 377 (3 hits)

.github/workflows/auto-label-prs-by-contributor-type.yml:23, 40 (2 hits)

.github/workflows/deploy-production.yml:17, 23 (2 hits)

.github/workflows/credit-reward-automation.yml:23

.github/workflows/documentation-review.yml:32

CI/CD securitySupply chainGitHub Actions

medium Security checks cicd CI/CD security conf 0.90 ✓ Repobility 3 occurrences GitHub Action is tag-pinned rather than SHA-pinned

[MINED115] Action `UnlyEd/github-action-await-vercel` pinned to mutable ref `@v1.2.14`: `uses: UnlyEd/[email protected]` resolves at workflow-run time. Tags and branches can be re-pushed by the action owner; that made the tj-actions/changed-files compromise (2025) instantly affect …

lines 77, 89, 99

.github/workflows/deploy-production.yml:77, 89, 99 (3 hits)

CI/CD securitySupply chainGitHub Actions

high Security checks cicd CI/CD security conf 0.90 ✓ Repobility GitHub Action is tag-pinned rather than SHA-pinned

[MINED115] Action `derrickmehaffy/vercel-preview-url` pinned to mutable ref `@main`: `uses: derrickmehaffy/vercel-preview-url@main` resolves at workflow-run time. Tags and branches can be re-pushed by the action owner; that made the tj-actions/changed-files compromise (2025) instantly affect ~23K r…

.github/workflows/deploy-production.yml:67 CI/CD securitySupply chainGitHub Actions

medium Security checks quality Practices conf 1.00 [CFG006] Missing .gitignore: No .gitignore file. Risk of committing secrets and build artifacts.

Add a .gitignore appropriate for your language/framework.

medium Security checks quality Quality conf 1.00 [SEC087] JS: weak Math.random for crypto: Math.random() is not cryptographically secure; using it for tokens/keys/nonces is predictable. Ported from gosec G404 / eslint detect-pseudoRandomBytes concept (Apache-2.0).

Use `crypto.randomBytes(32).toString('hex')` (Node) or `crypto.getRandomValues()` (browser).

docusaurus/src/components/InteractiveQueryBuilder/InteractiveQueryBuilder.jsx:16

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