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rails/rails

https://github.com/rails/rails.git · scanned 2026-05-16 13:30 UTC (1 day, 8 hours ago) · 10 languages

248 findings (20 legacy + 228 scanner) 8/10 scanners ran Scanner says 74 (lower by 2)

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UNIFIED Repobility · multi-layer engine · AI coders

Complete repo analysis

Last scanned 1 day, 11 hours ago · v3 · 91 findings from 2 sources. Findings combine the legacy security pipeline AND the multi-layer engine (atlas, wiring, flows, ranked) AND verified AI agent contributions.

JSON
Combined
75.9
/100
Repobility
77
15 legacy
9-layer
74
100.0% cov · 76 gaps
Critical
9
click to filter
Agents
6
0 votes
Crowd
0
reported
{# ── 2026-05-17 R27 #5: score breakdown panel ────────────────────── Surfaces the score_breakdown JSON that's been silently stored on Repository for months. Turns hidden math into a trust signal. #}
Severity distribution — click a segment to filter
Active filters: severity: high × excluding tests × Reset all
Severity: Critical 9 High 12 Medium 27 Low 38 Source: Legacy 15 9-layer 76 Crowd 0 Layer: Quality 12 Security 36 Software 27 Api 1 Frontend 3 Hardware 2 Cicd 10
Scan summary Repository scanned at 74.4/100 with 100.0% coverage. It contains 5161 nodes across 0 cross-layer flows, written primarily in mixed languages. Engine surfaced 76 findings — concentrated in security (31), software (24), cicd (10). Risk profile is high: 9 critical, 7 high, 23 medium. Recommended next step: open the security layer findings first — that's where the highest-impact wins live.

Showing 10 of 91 findings. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

high Legacy security auth conf 0.70 [AUC003] Object-level route lacks visible authorization: A route with an object id-like parameter does not show nearby authentication or authorization evidence. This is a BOLA/IDOR review target. Endpoint: ANY /:inbound_email_id/incinerate.
Add ownership, tenant, relationship, or policy checks before reading or mutating the target object.
actionmailbox/config/routes.rb:24 authlegacy
high Legacy security auth conf 0.70 [AUC003] Object-level route lacks visible authorization: A route with an object id-like parameter does not show nearby authentication or authorization evidence. This is a BOLA/IDOR review target. Endpoint: ANY /:inbound_email_id/reroute.
Add ownership, tenant, relationship, or policy checks before reading or mutating the target object.
actionmailbox/config/routes.rb:23 authlegacy
high Legacy software ssrf conf 1.00 [SEC029] Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) — outbound HTTP from user input: Outbound HTTP request to a user-controlled URL without allowlist validation. Attackers can probe internal services (169.254.169.254 metadata, internal Kubernetes endpoints, file:// URIs), exfiltrate data, or pivot through your network. SSRF is OWASP A10:2021 and a frequent foothold in cloud breaches.
Validate the URL against an allowlist BEFORE fetching: ALLOWED = {'images.example.com', 'cdn.example.com'} host = urlparse(url).hostname if host not in ALLOWED: abort(400) Or use a server-side proxy (Imgproxy / serve-files-only-from-S3) that isolates outbound network access from the request h…
actionmailbox/app/controllers/rails/conductor/action_mailbox/inbound_emails/sources_controller.rb:12 ssrflegacy
high Legacy software ssrf conf 1.00 [SEC029] Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) — outbound HTTP from user input: Outbound HTTP request to a user-controlled URL without allowlist validation. Attackers can probe internal services (169.254.169.254 metadata, internal Kubernetes endpoints, file:// URIs), exfiltrate data, or pivot through your network. SSRF is OWASP A10:2021 and a frequent foothold in cloud breaches.
Validate the URL against an allowlist BEFORE fetching: ALLOWED = {'images.example.com', 'cdn.example.com'} host = urlparse(url).hostname if host not in ALLOWED: abort(400) Or use a server-side proxy (Imgproxy / serve-files-only-from-S3) that isolates outbound network access from the request h…
actionmailbox/app/controllers/rails/conductor/action_mailbox/reroutes_controller.rb:12 ssrflegacy
high Legacy software ssrf conf 1.00 [SEC029] Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) — outbound HTTP from user input: Outbound HTTP request to a user-controlled URL without allowlist validation. Attackers can probe internal services (169.254.169.254 metadata, internal Kubernetes endpoints, file:// URIs), exfiltrate data, or pivot through your network. SSRF is OWASP A10:2021 and a frequent foothold in cloud breaches.
Validate the URL against an allowlist BEFORE fetching: ALLOWED = {'images.example.com', 'cdn.example.com'} host = urlparse(url).hostname if host not in ALLOWED: abort(400) Or use a server-side proxy (Imgproxy / serve-files-only-from-S3) that isolates outbound network access from the request h…
actionmailbox/app/controllers/rails/conductor/action_mailbox/inbound_emails_controller.rb:20 ssrflegacy
high 9-layer security owasp conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'eval_used' in activestorage/app/assets/javascripts/activestorage.esm.js:490
Found a known-risky pattern (eval_used). Review and replace if possible.
activestorage/app/assets/javascripts/activestorage.esm.js:490 owaspeval_used
high 9-layer security owasp conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'eval_used' in activestorage/app/assets/javascripts/activestorage.js:489
Found a known-risky pattern (eval_used). Review and replace if possible.
activestorage/app/assets/javascripts/activestorage.js:489 owaspeval_used
high 9-layer security owasp conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'eval_used' in activesupport/lib/active_support/core_ext/string/output_safety.rb:220
Found a known-risky pattern (eval_used). Review and replace if possible.
activesupport/lib/active_support/core_ext/string/output_safety.rb:220 owaspeval_used
high 9-layer security owasp conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'eval_used' in railties/lib/rails/commands/query/query_command.rb:102
Found a known-risky pattern (eval_used). Review and replace if possible.
railties/lib/rails/commands/query/query_command.rb:102 owaspeval_used
high 9-layer security owasp conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'eval_used' in railties/lib/rails/commands/runner/runner_command.rb:38
Found a known-risky pattern (eval_used). Review and replace if possible.
railties/lib/rails/commands/runner/runner_command.rb:38 owaspeval_used
{# ── 2026-05-17 Round 14: AI-agent bridge footer ────────────────────── Discoverability: the /agents/voting/ guide + MCP manifest exist but aren't linked from anywhere users actually land. Small, opt-in footer. #}
For AI agents: Voting guide (TP/FP) MCP manifest Stdio wrapper SARIF Integrate Findings queue Vote TP/FP on findings to calibrate the engine.
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