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DanOps-1/Gpt-Agreement-Payment

https://github.com/DanOps-1/Gpt-Agreement-Payment · scanned 2026-05-17 01:36 UTC (14 hours, 46 minutes ago) · 10 languages

249 findings (16 legacy + 233 scanner) 84th percentile · Python · medium (20-100K LoC) Scanner says 68 (higher by 12)

UNIFIED Repobility · multi-layer engine · AI coders

Complete repo analysis

Last scanned 14 hours, 45 minutes ago · v2 · 132 findings from 2 sources. Findings combine the legacy security pipeline AND the multi-layer engine (atlas, wiring, flows, ranked) AND verified AI agent contributions.

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Severity distribution — click a segment to filter
Active filters: source: legacy × excluding tests × Reset all
Severity: Critical 0 High 31 Medium 5 Low 94 Source: Legacy 16 9-layer 116 Crowd 0 Layer: Security 28 Quality 32 Software 31 Frontend 2 Cicd 2 Api 37
Scan summary Repository scanned at 67.5/100 with 100.0% coverage. It contains 1435 nodes across 30 cross-layer flows, written primarily in mixed languages. Engine surfaced 116 findings — concentrated in api (37), software (28), quality (24). Risk profile is high: 0 critical, 22 high, 1 medium. Recommended next step: open the api layer findings first — that's where the highest-impact wins live.

Showing 16 of 132 findings. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

high Legacy security injection conf 0.50 [SEC004] SQL Injection Risk: String interpolation in SQL execution. Allows SQL injection.
Use parameterized queries: c.execute('SELECT * FROM t WHERE id = ?', [id]). For dynamic table or column names, choose identifiers from a hard-coded allowlist and keep values in parameters.
webui/backend/db.py:200 injectionlegacy
high Legacy security credential_exposure conf 0.85 [SEC020] Secret Printed to Logs: Debug or diagnostic code appears to print a credential-bearing value. This is a frequent AI-assisted coding failure: the helper exposes the exact value needed for troubleshooting.
Log only redacted, hashed, or last-four-style metadata. Rotate any secret that may have reached logs.
CTF-reg/sentinel_v1_legacy.py:123 credential_exposurelegacy
high Legacy security credential_exposure conf 0.92 [SEC020] Secret Printed to Logs: Debug or diagnostic code appears to print a credential-bearing value. This is a frequent AI-assisted coding failure: the helper exposes the exact value needed for troubleshooting.
Log only redacted, hashed, or last-four-style metadata. Rotate any secret that may have reached logs.
CTF-reg/browser_register.py:152 credential_exposurelegacy
high Legacy software ssrf conf 1.00 [SEC029] Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) — outbound HTTP from user input: Outbound HTTP request to a user-controlled URL without allowlist validation. Attackers can probe internal services (169.254.169.254 metadata, internal Kubernetes endpoints, file:// URIs), exfiltrate data, or pivot through your network. SSRF is OWASP A10:2021 and a frequent foothold in cloud breaches.
Validate the URL against an allowlist BEFORE fetching: ALLOWED = {'images.example.com', 'cdn.example.com'} host = urlparse(url).hostname if host not in ALLOWED: abort(400) Or use a server-side proxy (Imgproxy / serve-files-only-from-S3) that isolates outbound network access from the request h…
CTF-reg/auth_flow.py:472 ssrflegacy
high Legacy software ssrf conf 1.00 [SEC029] Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) — outbound HTTP from user input: Outbound HTTP request to a user-controlled URL without allowlist validation. Attackers can probe internal services (169.254.169.254 metadata, internal Kubernetes endpoints, file:// URIs), exfiltrate data, or pivot through your network. SSRF is OWASP A10:2021 and a frequent foothold in cloud breaches.
Validate the URL against an allowlist BEFORE fetching: ALLOWED = {'images.example.com', 'cdn.example.com'} host = urlparse(url).hostname if host not in ALLOWED: abort(400) Or use a server-side proxy (Imgproxy / serve-files-only-from-S3) that isolates outbound network access from the request h…
CTF-pay/hcaptcha_auto_solver.py:101 ssrflegacy
high Legacy software ssrf conf 1.00 [SEC029] Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) — outbound HTTP from user input: Outbound HTTP request to a user-controlled URL without allowlist validation. Attackers can probe internal services (169.254.169.254 metadata, internal Kubernetes endpoints, file:// URIs), exfiltrate data, or pivot through your network. SSRF is OWASP A10:2021 and a frequent foothold in cloud breaches.
Validate the URL against an allowlist BEFORE fetching: ALLOWED = {'images.example.com', 'cdn.example.com'} host = urlparse(url).hostname if host not in ALLOWED: abort(400) Or use a server-side proxy (Imgproxy / serve-files-only-from-S3) that isolates outbound network access from the request h…
CTF-pay/card.py:3351 ssrflegacy
high Legacy quality error_handling conf 1.00 [ERR001] Silent Exception Swallowing: Silently swallowing all exceptions hides bugs. Even in cleanup code, log at DEBUG level.
Log the error: `except Exception: logger.debug('cleanup failed', exc_info=True)`. Or handle specific exception types.
CTF-pay/hcaptcha_auto_solver.py:3042 error_handlinglegacy
high Legacy quality error_handling conf 1.00 [ERR001] Silent Exception Swallowing: Silently swallowing all exceptions hides bugs. Even in cleanup code, log at DEBUG level.
Log the error: `except Exception: logger.debug('cleanup failed', exc_info=True)`. Or handle specific exception types.
CTF-pay/gopay.py:162 error_handlinglegacy
high Legacy quality error_handling conf 1.00 [ERR001] Silent Exception Swallowing: Silently swallowing all exceptions hides bugs. Even in cleanup code, log at DEBUG level.
Log the error: `except Exception: logger.debug('cleanup failed', exc_info=True)`. Or handle specific exception types.
CTF-pay/card.py:158 error_handlinglegacy
medium Legacy security injection conf 0.50 [SEC005] Command Injection Risk: Unsafe shell execution or eval of user input.
Use subprocess with shell=False and a list of args. Never eval user input.
CTF-reg/auth_flow.py:874 injectionlegacy
medium Legacy security path_traversal conf 1.00 [SEC012] ZipSlip — Archive Path Traversal: Archive extraction without path validation allows writing files outside the target directory.
Validate extracted paths with os.path.realpath() and ensure they stay within the target directory.
webui/backend/wa_relay.py:81 path_traversallegacy
medium Legacy quality quality conf 0.73 Codex session log reader may expose prompts or tool-call content
Codex session JSONL files can contain prompts, tool events, paths, and operational metadata, not only token counts. Token dashboards and exporters should avoid retaining or sharing raw session text.
CTF-reg/auth_flow.py:174 qualitylegacy
medium Legacy quality quality conf 0.80 localStorage write failures are swallowed silently
localStorage quotas are small and writes can fail. Catching storage errors without a user-visible warning causes silent data loss when notes, images, or snapshots exceed quota.
webui/frontend/src/views/Run.vue:575 qualitylegacy
low Legacy quality quality conf 0.86 Duplicated implementation block across source files
Duplicated blocks are a common artifact when generated code is pasted or recreated instead of reused. They increase maintenance cost because every future bug fix must be found in multiple locations.
webui/frontend/src/views/Setup.vue:28 qualitylegacy
low Legacy quality quality conf 0.86 Duplicated implementation block across source files
Duplicated blocks are a common artifact when generated code is pasted or recreated instead of reused. They increase maintenance cost because every future bug fix must be found in multiple locations.
webui/frontend/src/components/steps/Step09_VLM.vue:13 qualitylegacy
low Legacy quality quality conf 0.86 Duplicated implementation block across source files
Duplicated blocks are a common artifact when generated code is pasted or recreated instead of reused. They increase maintenance cost because every future bug fix must be found in multiple locations.
webui/frontend/src/components/steps/Step08_Captcha.vue:12 qualitylegacy
{# ── 2026-05-17 Round 14: AI-agent bridge footer ────────────────────── Discoverability: the /agents/voting/ guide + MCP manifest exist but aren't linked from anywhere users actually land. Small, opt-in footer. #}
For AI agents: Voting guide (TP/FP) MCP manifest Stdio wrapper SARIF Integrate Findings queue Vote TP/FP on findings to calibrate the engine.
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