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multica

https://github.com/multica-ai/multica · scanned 2026-05-17 02:50 UTC (13 hours, 32 minutes ago) · 10 languages

761 findings (52 legacy + 709 scanner) 2nd percentile · Typescript · large (100-500K LoC) Scanner says 63 (lower by 6)

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UNIFIED Repobility · multi-layer engine · AI coders

Complete repo analysis

Last scanned 13 hours, 32 minutes ago · v2 · 407 findings from 2 sources. Findings combine the legacy security pipeline AND the multi-layer engine (atlas, wiring, flows, ranked) AND verified AI agent contributions.

JSON
Combined
52.5
/100
Repobility
42
52 legacy
9-layer
63
100.0% cov · 355 gaps
Critical
12
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Agents
6
0 votes
Crowd
0
reported
Severity distribution — click a segment to filter
Active filters: severity: high × excluding tests × Reset all
Severity: Critical 12 High 8 Medium 54 Low 106 Source: Legacy 52 9-layer 355 Crowd 0 Layer: Quality 182 Software 59 Security 29 Cicd 38 Api 1 Frontend 94 Hardware 4
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Scan summary Repository scanned at 63.3/100 with 100.0% coverage. It contains 4685 nodes across 30 cross-layer flows, written primarily in mixed languages. Engine surfaced 355 findings — concentrated in quality (164), frontend (94), software (50). Risk profile is high: 0 critical, 1 high, 35 medium. Recommended next step: open the quality layer findings first — that's where the highest-impact wins live.

Showing 7 of 407 findings. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

high Legacy security path_traversal conf 0.80 [SEC013] Path Traversal — User Input in File Path: User-controlled input used in file path without sanitization. Allows reading arbitrary files.
Use os.path.realpath() and verify the path starts with your expected base directory. Use secure_filename() for uploads.
packages/views/issues/components/issue-detail.tsx:1333 path_traversallegacy
high Legacy security credential_exposure conf 0.85 [SEC020] Secret Printed to Logs: Debug or diagnostic code appears to print a credential-bearing value. This is a frequent AI-assisted coding failure: the helper exposes the exact value needed for troubleshooting.
Log only redacted, hashed, or last-four-style metadata. Rotate any secret that may have reached logs.
server/internal/daemon/daemon.go:683 credential_exposurelegacy
high Legacy software ssrf conf 1.00 [SEC029] Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) — outbound HTTP from user input: Outbound HTTP request to a user-controlled URL without allowlist validation. Attackers can probe internal services (169.254.169.254 metadata, internal Kubernetes endpoints, file:// URIs), exfiltrate data, or pivot through your network. SSRF is OWASP A10:2021 and a frequent foothold in cloud breaches.
Validate the URL against an allowlist BEFORE fetching: ALLOWED = {'images.example.com', 'cdn.example.com'} host = urlparse(url).hostname if host not in ALLOWED: abort(400) Or use a server-side proxy (Imgproxy / serve-files-only-from-S3) that isolates outbound network access from the request h…
apps/desktop/src/main/external-url.ts:6 ssrflegacy
high Legacy software ssrf conf 1.00 [SEC029] Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) — outbound HTTP from user input: Outbound HTTP request to a user-controlled URL without allowlist validation. Attackers can probe internal services (169.254.169.254 metadata, internal Kubernetes endpoints, file:// URIs), exfiltrate data, or pivot through your network. SSRF is OWASP A10:2021 and a frequent foothold in cloud breaches.
Validate the URL against an allowlist BEFORE fetching: ALLOWED = {'images.example.com', 'cdn.example.com'} host = urlparse(url).hostname if host not in ALLOWED: abort(400) Or use a server-side proxy (Imgproxy / serve-files-only-from-S3) that isolates outbound network access from the request h…
apps/desktop/src/main/daemon-manager.ts:113 ssrflegacy
high Legacy software ssrf conf 1.00 [SEC029] Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) — outbound HTTP from user input: Outbound HTTP request to a user-controlled URL without allowlist validation. Attackers can probe internal services (169.254.169.254 metadata, internal Kubernetes endpoints, file:// URIs), exfiltrate data, or pivot through your network. SSRF is OWASP A10:2021 and a frequent foothold in cloud breaches.
Validate the URL against an allowlist BEFORE fetching: ALLOWED = {'images.example.com', 'cdn.example.com'} host = urlparse(url).hostname if host not in ALLOWED: abort(400) Or use a server-side proxy (Imgproxy / serve-files-only-from-S3) that isolates outbound network access from the request h…
apps/desktop/scripts/package.mjs:427 ssrflegacy
high Legacy software resource_exhaustion conf 1.00 [SEC035] Unbounded Resource Allocation — DoS risk: Allocating resources (buffers, recursion stack, large ranges) based on user input without an upper bound. Attackers send `size=10000000` to exhaust memory, or trigger expensive computation. CWE-770/400. Examples: CVE-2023-44487 (HTTP/2 Rapid Reset), countless YAML/XML billion-laughs variants.
Cap user-controlled sizes BEFORE allocation: size = min(int(request.args.get('n', 100)), MAX_SIZE) Set framework-level limits: Flask: app.config['MAX_CONTENT_LENGTH'] = 10 * 1024 * 1024 FastAPI: use middleware to enforce request size Django: DATA_UPLOAD_MAX_MEMORY_SIZE in settings.py …
server/internal/handler/skill_create.go:37 resource_exhaustionlegacy
high Legacy software resource_exhaustion conf 1.00 [SEC035] Unbounded Resource Allocation — DoS risk: Allocating resources (buffers, recursion stack, large ranges) based on user input without an upper bound. Attackers send `size=10000000` to exhaust memory, or trigger expensive computation. CWE-770/400. Examples: CVE-2023-44487 (HTTP/2 Rapid Reset), countless YAML/XML billion-laughs variants.
Cap user-controlled sizes BEFORE allocation: size = min(int(request.args.get('n', 100)), MAX_SIZE) Set framework-level limits: Flask: app.config['MAX_CONTENT_LENGTH'] = 10 * 1024 * 1024 FastAPI: use middleware to enforce request size Django: DATA_UPLOAD_MAX_MEMORY_SIZE in settings.py …
server/internal/handler/skill.go:1708 resource_exhaustionlegacy
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