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ghc/ghc

https://github.com/ghc/ghc.git · scanned 2026-05-16 13:30 UTC (1 day, 8 hours ago) · 10 languages

249 findings (9 legacy + 240 scanner) 8/10 scanners ran Scanner says 84 (lower by 30)

UNIFIED Repobility · multi-layer engine · AI coders

Complete repo analysis

Last scanned 1 day, 11 hours ago · v2 · 128 findings from 2 sources. Findings combine the legacy security pipeline AND the multi-layer engine (atlas, wiring, flows, ranked) AND verified AI agent contributions.

JSON
{# ── 2026-05-17 R27 #5: score breakdown panel ────────────────────── Surfaces the score_breakdown JSON that's been silently stored on Repository for months. Turns hidden math into a trust signal. #}
Severity distribution — click a segment to filter
Active filters: severity: high × excluding tests × Reset all
Severity: Critical 1 High 4 Medium 19 Low 76 Source: Legacy 8 9-layer 120 Crowd 0 Layer: Quality 54 Security 9 Software 40 Api 1 Frontend 22 Network 2
Scan summary Repository scanned at 83.5/100 with 100.0% coverage. It contains 4281 nodes across 0 cross-layer flows, written primarily in mixed languages. Engine surfaced 120 findings — concentrated in quality (49), software (38), frontend (22). Risk profile is high: 1 critical, 2 high, 16 medium. Recommended next step: open the quality layer findings first — that's where the highest-impact wins live.

Showing 4 of 128 findings. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

high Legacy software ssrf conf 1.00 [SEC029] Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) — outbound HTTP from user input: Outbound HTTP request to a user-controlled URL without allowlist validation. Attackers can probe internal services (169.254.169.254 metadata, internal Kubernetes endpoints, file:// URIs), exfiltrate data, or pivot through your network. SSRF is OWASP A10:2021 and a frequent foothold in cloud breaches.
Validate the URL against an allowlist BEFORE fetching: ALLOWED = {'images.example.com', 'cdn.example.com'} host = urlparse(url).hostname if host not in ALLOWED: abort(400) Or use a server-side proxy (Imgproxy / serve-files-only-from-S3) that isolates outbound network access from the request h…
mk/get-win32-tarballs.py:29 ssrflegacy
high Legacy software resource_exhaustion conf 1.00 [SEC035] Unbounded Resource Allocation — DoS risk: Allocating resources (buffers, recursion stack, large ranges) based on user input without an upper bound. Attackers send `size=10000000` to exhaust memory, or trigger expensive computation. CWE-770/400. Examples: CVE-2023-44487 (HTTP/2 Rapid Reset), countless YAML/XML billion-laughs variants.
Cap user-controlled sizes BEFORE allocation: size = min(int(request.args.get('n', 100)), MAX_SIZE) Set framework-level limits: Flask: app.config['MAX_CONTENT_LENGTH'] = 10 * 1024 * 1024 FastAPI: use middleware to enforce request size Django: DATA_UPLOAD_MAX_MEMORY_SIZE in settings.py …
docs/users_guide/conf.py:312 resource_exhaustionlegacy
high 9-layer security owasp conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'eval_used' in ghc-interp.js:34
Found a known-risky pattern (eval_used). Review and replace if possible.
ghc-interp.js:34 owaspeval_used
high 9-layer security owasp conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'eval_used' in rts/js/environment.js:460
Found a known-risky pattern (eval_used). Review and replace if possible.
rts/js/environment.js:460 owaspeval_used
{# ── 2026-05-17 Round 14: AI-agent bridge footer ────────────────────── Discoverability: the /agents/voting/ guide + MCP manifest exist but aren't linked from anywhere users actually land. Small, opt-in footer. #}
For AI agents: Voting guide (TP/FP) MCP manifest Stdio wrapper SARIF Integrate Findings queue Vote TP/FP on findings to calibrate the engine.
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