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ghc/ghc

https://github.com/ghc/ghc.git · scanned 2026-05-16 13:30 UTC (1 day, 8 hours ago) · 10 languages

249 findings (9 legacy + 240 scanner) 8/10 scanners ran Scanner says 84 (lower by 30)

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UNIFIED Repobility · multi-layer engine · AI coders

Complete repo analysis

Last scanned 1 day, 11 hours ago · v2 · 128 findings from 2 sources. Findings combine the legacy security pipeline AND the multi-layer engine (atlas, wiring, flows, ranked) AND verified AI agent contributions.

JSON
Combined
74.1
/100
Repobility
65
8 legacy
9-layer
84
100.0% cov · 120 gaps
Critical
1
click to filter
Agents
6
0 votes
Crowd
0
reported
{# ── 2026-05-17 R27 #5: score breakdown panel ────────────────────── Surfaces the score_breakdown JSON that's been silently stored on Repository for months. Turns hidden math into a trust signal. #}
Severity distribution — click a segment to filter
Active filters: severity: medium × excluding tests × Reset all
Severity: Critical 1 High 4 Medium 19 Low 76 Source: Legacy 8 9-layer 120 Crowd 0 Layer: Quality 54 Security 9 Software 40 Api 1 Frontend 22 Network 2
Scan summary Repository scanned at 83.5/100 with 100.0% coverage. It contains 4281 nodes across 0 cross-layer flows, written primarily in mixed languages. Engine surfaced 120 findings — concentrated in quality (49), software (38), frontend (22). Risk profile is high: 1 critical, 2 high, 16 medium. Recommended next step: open the quality layer findings first — that's where the highest-impact wins live.

Showing 18 of 128 findings. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

medium Legacy quality practices conf 1.00 [CFG006] Missing .gitignore: No .gitignore file. Risk of committing secrets and build artifacts.
Add a .gitignore appropriate for your language/framework.
practiceslegacy
medium Legacy security deserialization conf 1.00 [SEC007] Unsafe Deserialization: Unsafe deserialization can execute arbitrary code.
Use yaml.safe_load() instead of yaml.load(). Avoid pickle for untrusted data.
.gitlab/rel_eng/upload_ghc_libs.py:258 deserializationlegacy
medium Legacy quality practices No CI/CD configuration found
Add a CI/CD pipeline: create .github/workflows/ci.yml for GitHub Actions with steps to lint, test, and build on every push and pull request.
practiceslegacy
medium 9-layer frontend frontend-quality conf 1.00 `dangerouslySetInnerHTML` used in a React component — utils/haddock/haddock-api/resources/html/haddock-bundle.min.js:1
Open XSS surface unless the input is provably trusted. Replace with explicit JSX or sanitize via a vetted library. Why: OWASP basics. Already partially flagged by the security analyzer. Rule id: fq.dangerous-html
frontend-qualityfq.dangerous-html
medium 9-layer frontend frontend-quality conf 1.00 `dangerouslySetInnerHTML` used in a React component — utils/haddock/haddock-api/resources/html/js-src/quick-jump.tsx:350
Open XSS surface unless the input is provably trusted. Replace with explicit JSX or sanitize via a vetted library. Why: OWASP basics. Already partially flagged by the security analyzer. Rule id: fq.dangerous-html
frontend-qualityfq.dangerous-html
medium 9-layer frontend frontend-quality conf 1.00 `dangerouslySetInnerHTML` used in a React component — utils/haddock/haddock-api/resources/html/quick-jump.min.js:1
Open XSS surface unless the input is provably trusted. Replace with explicit JSX or sanitize via a vetted library. Why: OWASP basics. Already partially flagged by the security analyzer. Rule id: fq.dangerous-html
frontend-qualityfq.dangerous-html
medium 9-layer security owasp conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'dangerous_innerhtml' in utils/haddock/haddock-api/resources/html/haddock-bundle.min.js:1
Found a known-risky pattern (dangerous_innerhtml). Review and replace if possible.
utils/haddock/haddock-api/resources/html/haddock-bundle.min.js:1 owaspdangerous_innerhtml
medium 9-layer security owasp conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'dangerous_innerhtml' in utils/haddock/haddock-api/resources/html/js-src/quick-jump.tsx:350
Found a known-risky pattern (dangerous_innerhtml). Review and replace if possible.
utils/haddock/haddock-api/resources/html/js-src/quick-jump.tsx:350 owaspdangerous_innerhtml
medium 9-layer security owasp conf 1.00 Insecure pattern 'dangerous_innerhtml' in utils/haddock/haddock-api/resources/html/quick-jump.min.js:1
Found a known-risky pattern (dangerous_innerhtml). Review and replace if possible.
utils/haddock/haddock-api/resources/html/quick-jump.min.js:1 owaspdangerous_innerhtml
medium 9-layer quality integrity conf 1.00 Network/subprocess call without timeout or try/except — .gitlab/rel_eng/fetch-gitlab-artifacts/fetch_gitlab.py:108
`subprocess.run(...)` here lacks both a `timeout=` arg and an enclosing try/except. This is exactly the class of bug that took down our git-clone earlier (HTTP/2 stream cancel surfaced as a fatal). Add a `timeout=` and wrap in try/except, or use a wrapper that retries.
integrityfragile-runtimerobustness
medium 9-layer quality integrity conf 1.00 Network/subprocess call without timeout or try/except — docs/users_guide/compare-flags.py:51
`subprocess.check_output(...)` here lacks both a `timeout=` arg and an enclosing try/except. This is exactly the class of bug that took down our git-clone earlier (HTTP/2 stream cancel surfaced as a fatal). Add a `timeout=` and wrap in try/except, or use a wrapper that retries.
integrityfragile-runtimerobustness
medium 9-layer quality integrity conf 1.00 Network/subprocess call without timeout or try/except — hadrian/bootstrap/bootstrap.py:345
`urllib.request.urlopen(...)` here lacks both a `timeout=` arg and an enclosing try/except. This is exactly the class of bug that took down our git-clone earlier (HTTP/2 stream cancel surfaced as a fatal). Add a `timeout=` and wrap in try/except, or use a wrapper that retries.
integrityfragile-runtimerobustness
medium 9-layer quality integrity conf 1.00 Network/subprocess call without timeout or try/except — mk/get-win32-tarballs.py:24
`urllib.request.urlretrieve(...)` here lacks both a `timeout=` arg and an enclosing try/except. This is exactly the class of bug that took down our git-clone earlier (HTTP/2 stream cancel surfaced as a fatal). Add a `timeout=` and wrap in try/except, or use a wrapper that retries.
integrityfragile-runtimerobustness
medium 9-layer quality integrity conf 1.00 Network/subprocess call without timeout or try/except — testsuite/driver/perf_notes.py:208
`subprocess.check_output(...)` here lacks both a `timeout=` arg and an enclosing try/except. This is exactly the class of bug that took down our git-clone earlier (HTTP/2 stream cancel surfaced as a fatal). Add a `timeout=` and wrap in try/except, or use a wrapper that retries.
integrityfragile-runtimerobustness
medium 9-layer quality integrity conf 1.00 Network/subprocess call without timeout or try/except — testsuite/driver/testutil.py:58
`subprocess.run(...)` here lacks both a `timeout=` arg and an enclosing try/except. This is exactly the class of bug that took down our git-clone earlier (HTTP/2 stream cancel surfaced as a fatal). Add a `timeout=` and wrap in try/except, or use a wrapper that retries.
integrityfragile-runtimerobustness
medium 9-layer security coverage conf 1.00 No auth library detected
The scanner did not find any standard auth library (JWT, OAuth, NextAuth, Auth0, etc.). Either auth lives in custom code, in a separate service, or is missing.
coverageauth
medium 9-layer network security conf 1.00 Privileged port 17 in use
Port 17 is privileged (<1024). Make sure the service runs with the right caps or front it with a non-privileged port via a load balancer.
.gitlab/ci.sh securityports
medium 9-layer network security conf 1.00 Privileged port 36 in use
Port 36 is privileged (<1024). Make sure the service runs with the right caps or front it with a non-privileged port via a load balancer.
.gitlab/ci.sh securityports
{# ── 2026-05-17 Round 14: AI-agent bridge footer ────────────────────── Discoverability: the /agents/voting/ guide + MCP manifest exist but aren't linked from anywhere users actually land. Small, opt-in footer. #}
For AI agents: Voting guide (TP/FP) MCP manifest Stdio wrapper SARIF Integrate Findings queue Vote TP/FP on findings to calibrate the engine.
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