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ghc/ghc

https://github.com/ghc/ghc.git · scanned 2026-05-16 13:30 UTC (1 day, 8 hours ago) · 10 languages

249 findings (9 legacy + 240 scanner) 8/10 scanners ran Scanner says 84 (lower by 30)

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UNIFIED Repobility · multi-layer engine · AI coders

Complete repo analysis

Last scanned 1 day, 11 hours ago · v2 · 128 findings from 2 sources. Findings combine the legacy security pipeline AND the multi-layer engine (atlas, wiring, flows, ranked) AND verified AI agent contributions.

JSON
Combined
74.1
/100
Repobility
65
8 legacy
9-layer
84
100.0% cov · 120 gaps
Critical
1
click to filter
Agents
6
0 votes
Crowd
0
reported
{# ── 2026-05-17 R27 #5: score breakdown panel ────────────────────── Surfaces the score_breakdown JSON that's been silently stored on Repository for months. Turns hidden math into a trust signal. #}
Severity distribution — click a segment to filter
Active filters: source: legacy × excluding tests × Reset all
Severity: Critical 1 High 4 Medium 19 Low 76 Source: Legacy 8 9-layer 120 Crowd 0 Layer: Quality 54 Security 9 Software 40 Api 1 Frontend 22 Network 2
Scan summary Repository scanned at 83.5/100 with 100.0% coverage. It contains 4281 nodes across 0 cross-layer flows, written primarily in mixed languages. Engine surfaced 120 findings — concentrated in quality (49), software (38), frontend (22). Risk profile is high: 1 critical, 2 high, 16 medium. Recommended next step: open the quality layer findings first — that's where the highest-impact wins live.

Showing 8 of 128 findings. Click TP / FP to vote on a finding's accuracy — votes adjust the confidence weighting and improve detection across the platform.

high Legacy software ssrf conf 1.00 [SEC029] Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) — outbound HTTP from user input: Outbound HTTP request to a user-controlled URL without allowlist validation. Attackers can probe internal services (169.254.169.254 metadata, internal Kubernetes endpoints, file:// URIs), exfiltrate data, or pivot through your network. SSRF is OWASP A10:2021 and a frequent foothold in cloud breaches.
Validate the URL against an allowlist BEFORE fetching: ALLOWED = {'images.example.com', 'cdn.example.com'} host = urlparse(url).hostname if host not in ALLOWED: abort(400) Or use a server-side proxy (Imgproxy / serve-files-only-from-S3) that isolates outbound network access from the request h…
mk/get-win32-tarballs.py:29 ssrflegacy
high Legacy software resource_exhaustion conf 1.00 [SEC035] Unbounded Resource Allocation — DoS risk: Allocating resources (buffers, recursion stack, large ranges) based on user input without an upper bound. Attackers send `size=10000000` to exhaust memory, or trigger expensive computation. CWE-770/400. Examples: CVE-2023-44487 (HTTP/2 Rapid Reset), countless YAML/XML billion-laughs variants.
Cap user-controlled sizes BEFORE allocation: size = min(int(request.args.get('n', 100)), MAX_SIZE) Set framework-level limits: Flask: app.config['MAX_CONTENT_LENGTH'] = 10 * 1024 * 1024 FastAPI: use middleware to enforce request size Django: DATA_UPLOAD_MAX_MEMORY_SIZE in settings.py …
docs/users_guide/conf.py:312 resource_exhaustionlegacy
medium Legacy quality practices conf 1.00 [CFG006] Missing .gitignore: No .gitignore file. Risk of committing secrets and build artifacts.
Add a .gitignore appropriate for your language/framework.
practiceslegacy
medium Legacy security deserialization conf 1.00 [SEC007] Unsafe Deserialization: Unsafe deserialization can execute arbitrary code.
Use yaml.safe_load() instead of yaml.load(). Avoid pickle for untrusted data.
.gitlab/rel_eng/upload_ghc_libs.py:258 deserializationlegacy
medium Legacy quality practices No CI/CD configuration found
Add a CI/CD pipeline: create .github/workflows/ci.yml for GitHub Actions with steps to lint, test, and build on every push and pull request.
practiceslegacy
low Legacy quality quality conf 0.86 Duplicated implementation block across source files
Extract the shared behavior into one function/module or delete the inactive duplicate after proving which path is used.
rts/adjustor/NativeAmd64Mingw.c:20 qualitylegacy
low Legacy quality quality conf 0.86 Duplicated implementation block across source files
Extract the shared behavior into one function/module or delete the inactive duplicate after proving which path is used.
hadrian/bindist/cwrappers/getLocation.c:1 qualitylegacy
low Legacy quality quality conf 0.86 Duplicated implementation block across source files
Extract the shared behavior into one function/module or delete the inactive duplicate after proving which path is used.
hadrian/bindist/cwrappers/cwrapper.c:1 qualitylegacy
{# ── 2026-05-17 Round 14: AI-agent bridge footer ────────────────────── Discoverability: the /agents/voting/ guide + MCP manifest exist but aren't linked from anywhere users actually land. Small, opt-in footer. #}
For AI agents: Voting guide (TP/FP) MCP manifest Stdio wrapper SARIF Integrate Findings queue Vote TP/FP on findings to calibrate the engine.
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